A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession to a European Customs Union

Kennedy, P. Lynn; Atıcı, Cemal

doi:10.1017/s1068280500008145

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We follow Johnson et al (1993), Rutström (1995), Kennedy et al (1996), and Kennedy and Atici (1999) by modeling the political process in two stages, with the outcome of the first stage described by an exogenously given PPF, and the second stage as a cooperative or noncooperative game. Based on the clearinghouse approach, we characterize country i 's government objective functions by 3 where U i,N is the welfare of non‐farmers and δ > 0 is the political weight of farmers relative to non‐farmers 4 .…”

Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

EU agri‐environmental programs and the “restaurant table effect”

Glebe¹,

Salhofer²

2007

Agricultural Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The share of agricultural area enrolled in EU agri-environmental programs varies significantly between EU member states. These national differences are explained, based on a model that reflects both, that these programs internalize externalities and the political economy. We identify six factors that affect the extent to which agri-environmental programs are implemented: environmental benefits, opportunity costs of participation, budgetary pressure, the share of program expenditures financed by the EU, the political weight attributed to farmers at the national, and the political influence of each country at the EU level. In addition, we demonstrate that, if the policy decision-making process is noncooperative at the EU level, countries that contribute less to the EU budget will ceteris paribus implement more programs. Using data of four years and feasible generalized least square methods, we are able to confirm our theoretical results including a noncooperative behavior of EU member states.JEL classifications: C7, H23, Q18

show abstract

Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

EU agri‐environmental programs and the “restaurant table effect”

Glebe¹,

Salhofer²

2007

Agricultural Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In addition, to estimate these weights, the number of policy instruments must equal the number of interest group preference weights so that the resulting matrix of first order conditions of full rank (Bullock, 1994). By construction, this is always possible since the producer and consumer groups can be defined in finer subgroups such that rank is always obtained (Kennedy and Atici, 1999). These weights for five producer groups and consumers were calculated for both EU and US from 1980 to 2000 in five-year intervals.…”

Section: Calculations Of Weightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The model distinguishes between the EU, the US, and a politically passive rest of the world. In an extended version of the similar study, Kennedy and Atici (1999) examined the entrance of additional countries into the EU utilizing the results of a trade simulation model as components of a PPF. Ndayisenga and Kinsey (1995) incorporated lobbying efforts into a microeconomic model of profit maximizing farmer utilizing the producer subsidy equivalents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Atıcı

2005

J Prod Anal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study determines the perceived weights of various producer groups by policy makers in selected sectors (wheat, corn, sugar, beef and veal, and milk), for both the US and the EU, from 1980 to 2000, in five-year intervals. Results show that the US’s weights deviate less than the EU’s, compared with the external protections, indicating that the lobbying efforts of interest groups in the US are reflected more closely in external policy design, and are therefore more efficient than those in the EU. Game simulation suggests that it is in the best interest of both blocs to choose the status quo action among various trade liberalization scenarios with the latest calculated weights. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005weight efficiency, lobbying, political preferences, bilateral agricultural trade,

show abstract

“…However, the idea that developing countries may benefit from protectionism, as indicated by the new trade theories, is also criticized (Alam, 1995). In some countries, many traditional commodities are highly protected, and the elimination of trade barriers might cause serious problems for the majority of producers in those sectors (Kennedy and Atici, 1999). In addition, a lack of antitrust policies and import-substitution structures are factors that harm trade.…”

Section: Equitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With liberalization, some overly protected sectors may be harmed, causing the inequalities in agriculture itself to increase. In some countries, many traditional commodities are highly protected, and the elimination of trade barriers might cause serious problems for the majority of producers in those sectors (Kennedy and Atici, 1999). In this case, sector-specific transfers such as income support targeting farmers could be implemented.…”

Section: Equitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberalization–Goals Trade-Offs

Atıcı¹

2005

Outlook Agric

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Equity, efficiency, security and liberty are the four main policy goals in a society. This paper examines the current trade-offs of these goals with agricultural trade liberalization for developing countries. Trade liberalization may cause contradictory results for developing countries. While trade liberalization may improve the welfare of a country, the distribution of income in that country may deteriorate. Efficiency, on the other hand, is another concept that depends not only on who defines it, but also on how it is defined. Liberalized trade may increase the efficient use of resources; however, it may also harm sustainability. Free trade may pave the way for liberty; however, new regional trading blocs may curtail the free choice of states, causing greater interdependence. Trade data over recent years show a decreasing share of total trade in developing countries despite an increase in the absolute value. Thus, liberalized trade in agriculture could help developing countries to achieve these universal goals if it were accompanied by decisive reforms and supported by international consciousness.

show abstract

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession to a European Customs Union

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

EU agri‐environmental programs and the “restaurant table effect”

EU agri‐environmental programs and the “restaurant table effect”

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Liberalization–Goals Trade-Offs

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About