A Game-Theoretic Analytical Approach for Fostering Energy-Saving Innovation in the Electric Vehicle Supply Chain

Wang, Jun-bin; Huang, Lufei

doi:10.1177/21582440211021581

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The NEVs' market demand is [47,48], where a is the market demand, p is the NEVs price, and θ is the consumers' preference. The more significant θ indicates the greater the impact of technical performance on market demand.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

New energy vehicles’ technology innovation coordination strategy based on alliance negotiation under dual credit policy

Ma,

Meng,

Huang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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The development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is one of the effective ways to alleviate carbon emissions, environmental pollution, and energy scarcity in the transportation sector. The Chinese government has innovatively proposed the “dual credit policy,” but it is still a hot topic whether it can promote the NEVs’ technological innovation. In this study, we construct game models and obtain the technological innovation strategies for NEVs under the dual credit policy, considering that the NEV supply chain contains one manufacturer and N suppliers. Further, we construct bargaining game models and study how to encourage manufacturers and suppliers to enhance technological innovation, realize supply chain coordination, and give the alliance strategy to maximize suppliers’ profit. We found that the dual credit policy can effectively stimulate technological innovation, and the higher the credit price or technological innovation credit factor, the higher the technical level of NEVs. The findings could guide the government to adjust and revise the policy. Second, we found that the bargaining games could coordinate the NEV supply chain so that decentralized enterprises can achieve optimal technological innovation under centralized decision-making. Third, we found that suppliers can improve their profits by choosing a suitable alliance strategy under the manufacturer’s different negotiating power.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

New energy vehicles’ technology innovation coordination strategy based on alliance negotiation under dual credit policy

Ma,

Meng,

Huang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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show abstract

“…The NEV market demand function is q a − p + θ n i 1 T i (Ma et al, 2018;Wang and Huang, 2021), where a is the potential demand, p is the NEV sales price, θ is the sensitivity coefficient of market demand, and the greater θ is, the more significant the impact of the supplier's technical level on market demand. T i (i 1, 2, /, n) is the technological innovation of supplier i.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal wholesale price and technological innovation under dual credit policy on carbon emission reduction in a supply chain

Meng

Huang

et al. 2023

Front. Environ. Sci.

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The adoption of new energy vehicles (NEVs) can effectively reduce vehicle exhaust emissions and achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals in the transportation sector. To facilitate the development of NEVs, the Chinese government issued the dual credit policy (DCP). However, whether the DCP can promote the technological innovation of NEVs and effectively reduce carbon emissions in the transportation sector remains to be studied. This study constructed the decision-making model of NEVs under the DCP and obtained the optimal strategy to study the impact of the DCP on carbon emissions. Furthermore, we constructed a bargaining game model based on an alliance strategy to demonstrate the coordination of the NEV supply chain. The results showed that implementing the DCP can effectively reduce carbon emissions in the transportation field. The higher the technological innovation credit coefficient or credit price, the more significant the DCP’s incentive effect on reducing carbon emissions. Decentralized decision-making weakens the DCP’s incentive effect on reducing carbon emissions. The bargaining game based on alliance negotiation can enable independent companies to achieve carbon emission reduction when making centralized decisions so that the DCP’s incentive effect on reducing carbon emissions is optimized. The alliance between manufacturers is not to increase profits but to enhance their product advantages. However, suppliers can gain higher profits by participating in the alliance, which provides a theoretical reference for the alliance’s cooperation in decision-making.

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“…Then, other studies investigate the incentive mechanism between the manufacturers and other agents, which refers to how to increase the effort of the corresponding agents in recycling activities using game theory (Y. Chen & Chen, 2019; Y. J. Li et al, 2019;Miao et al, 2017;Timoumi et al, 2021;Wang & Huang, 2021). This paper differs from this literature because it does not follow the game between the manufacturer and other supply chain members, but rather the comparison of closed-loop approaches.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chen & Chen, 2019; Y. J. Li et al, 2019; Miao et al, 2017; Timoumi et al, 2021; Wang & Huang, 2021). This paper differs from this literature because it does not follow the game between the manufacturer and other supply chain members, but rather the comparison of closed-loop approaches.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Versus Leasing in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: A Comparative Analysis Anchored on Consumer Ownership Perceptions

Chen,

Xu,

Dong

et al. 2023

Sage Open

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Manufacturers increasingly recycle end-of-life products to realize residual economic value and mitigate environmental impacts on the economic system. Concurrently, with the burgeoning growth of the product-service system, leasing models offer an alternative method to complete the material loop without direct collection. While prior research has delved into recycling channels, incentive mechanisms, and remanufacturing within closed-loop supply chain management, a comparative analysis between recycling and leasing strategies remains under-explored. This study seeks to bridge this gap by elucidating the manufacturer’s strategic decision-making process, factoring in consumers’ product ownership perceptions. We propose a manufacturer decision model anchored on consumer choices and segment it into three scenarios based on varying ownership perceptions. Our analysis contrasts market demand and profit outcomes across these scenarios. Notably, we discern that a hybrid strategy is optimal when ownership perception is low; however, when such perception is heightened, a dedicated recycling strategy proves more advantageous. Importantly, introducing a leasing option does not entirely overshadow the conventional sales market but is susceptible to being overshadowed itself. From a managerial standpoint, while integrating a leasing program might augment revenue streams, sole reliance on it is inadvisable. Furthermore, reshaping consumption paradigms to emphasize product functionality over ownership can pave the way for more expansive leasing strategies, optimizing revenue generation within a closed-loop framework.

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A Game-Theoretic Analytical Approach for Fostering Energy-Saving Innovation in the Electric Vehicle Supply Chain

Cited by 9 publications

References 32 publications

New energy vehicles’ technology innovation coordination strategy based on alliance negotiation under dual credit policy

New energy vehicles’ technology innovation coordination strategy based on alliance negotiation under dual credit policy

Optimal wholesale price and technological innovation under dual credit policy on carbon emission reduction in a supply chain

Recycling Versus Leasing in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: A Comparative Analysis Anchored on Consumer Ownership Perceptions

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