A game-theoretic approach to optimize ad hoc networks inspired by small-world network topology

Tan, Mian; Yang, Tinghong; Chen, Xing; Yang, Gang; Zhu, Guchuan; Holme, Petter; Zhao, Jing

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2017.12.032

Cited by 8 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…the transmit power used to send its own packets, which is denoted by p i . Second, the transmit power levels are not assumed to be binary but to lie in a general discrete set 1…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, nodes are in the situation where they have to relay packets, but have at the same time to manage the energy they spend for helping other nodes, and therefore exhibiting selfish behavior. To stimulate cooperation, incentive mechanisms have to be implemented [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. The vast majority of incentive mechanisms either rely on the idea of reputation [4,5,8] or the use of a credit system [9,10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The vast majority of incentive mechanisms either rely on the idea of reputation [4,5,8] or the use of a credit system [9,10]. Indeed, to capture the trade-off between a cooperative behavior (which is necessary to convey information through an ad hoc network) and a selfish behavior *Correspondence: berri.sara2012@gmail.com 1 Research Unit LaMOS (Modeling and Optimization of Systems), Faculty of Exact Sciences, University of Bejaia, 06000 Bejaia , Algeria 2 L2S (CNRS-CentraleSupelec-Univ. Paris-Saclay), 91192 Gif-sur-Yvette, France (which is necessary to manage the node energy), the authors of [5] and [8], and many other papers, exploited a simple but efficient model, which consists in assuming, whatever the size of the network, that the local node interaction only involves two neighboring nodes having a decision-making role; one of the virtues of considering the interaction to be local is the possibility of designing distributed transmission strategies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the Nash equilibrium of the strategic form static game (called the forwarder's dilemma in the corresponding literature), nodes do not transmit at all. To avoid this situation to happen in a real network, cooperation has to be stimulated by studying the repeated interaction between the nodes [1,5,8]. While providing an efficient solution, all the corresponding models still have some limitations, especially regarding the link quality fluctuations and partial knowledge at the nodes; indeed, they do not take into account the quality of the link between the transmitting and the receiving nodes, which may be an important issue since the link quality may strongly fluctuate if it is wireless.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a sample result, the network-consumed power is shown to be divided by more than two w.r.t. state-of-the art strategies [1,3,5,8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Efficient packet transmission in wireless ad hoc networks with partially informed nodes

Berri

Lasaulce

Radjef

2019

J Wireless Com Network

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One formal way of studying cooperation and incentive mechanisms in wireless ad hoc networks is to use game theory. In this respect, simple interaction models such as the forwarder's dilemma have been proposed and used successfully. However, this type of models is not suited to account for possible fluctuations of the wireless links of the network. Additionally, it does not allow one to study the way a node transmits its own packets. At last, the repeated game models used in the related literature do not allow the important scenario of nodes with partial information (about the link state and nodes actions) to be studied. One of the contributions of the present work is precisely to provide a general approach to integrate all of these aspects. Second, the best performance the nodes can achieve under partial information is fully characterized for a general form of utilities. Third, we derive an equilibrium transmission strategy which allows a node to adapt its transmit power levels and packet forwarding rate to link fluctuations and other node actions. The derived results are illustrated through a detailed numerical analysis for a network model built from a generalized version of the forwarder's dilemma. The analysis shows in particular that the proposed strategy is able to operate in the presence of channel fluctuations and to perform significantly better than the existing transmission mechanisms (e.g., in terms of consumed network energy).

show abstract

“…the transmit power used to send its own packets, which is denoted by p i . Second, the transmit power levels are not assumed to be binary but to lie in a general discrete set 1…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%