A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Abstract

This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations were judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling's explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard's with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams' with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. The broad outlines of a more general explanation that addresses all of the foundational questions associated with the crisis within the confines of a single, integrated, game-theoretic model with incomplete information are laid out.

A Conflict or War Impediment Strategic Approach: Perception Games, Deception Hypergames, and Deterrence in Global Politics

“…In contrast, we used the (CLRE) because (P-II) at one node of Play II could reveal that it is a deception hypergame or could not (i.e., the actual case) but acting upon uncertainty conditions and starting a deception sub-hypergame on its own _ where (P-I) is not aware that there would be a counter-hypergame being played, or that it would have misperception/ deception in a deception hypergame it initiated. So, the reached equilibria were not considered Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 6 that Zagare and Kilgour mainly proved in developing their Perfect Deterrence 4 Under a CLRE, there is uncertainty about Defender's willingness to respond in-kind to an initiation where Challenger misjudges Defender's intentions and is surprised by a limited response (Kilgour and Zagare, "Explaining Limited Conflicts"). Challenger at such a point prefers to not escalate, making a demand only and limited conflict arises, as it concludes that Defender will counter-escalate, and an allout conflict will occur (ibid).…”

“…If picked, (P-II)'s (Defect) choice results in the "(P-II)'s Victory and (P-I)'s Humiliating Capitulation Outcome," in terms of defeating (P-I) twice now in the entire hypergame after (P-I)'s preferring to initiate a subhypergame than to (Cooperate) in Play I, and then playing the (CC) strategy in Play II losing conflict gains it sought to seize through mutual-cooperation and (misperceived) "Compromise Outcome." Based on that, the payoffs achieved by (P-II)'s second (Defect) choice and (P-I)'s second cooperation action (i.e., "CC" first and "Cooperate Only" second) become: (1,4), so that (P-I) gets its zerostate worst payoff in the hypergame, with (P-II) getting its best.…”

“…The first is to (Defect Only), avoiding the escalation of conflict, where the outcome: "Limited Conflict and (P-I) Deterred" occurs, representing the "third sub-hypergame perfect Nash equilibrium" in the entire hypergame. That equilibrium indicates the first position of a Constrained Limited Response Equilibrium or (CLRE) 1 in the (DHMIC), where the payoffs are: (2,4). The (CLRE) concept, as well as the basic modeling of Play III, are borrowed from the Asymmetric Escalation Game of Perfect Deterrence Theory, which we adjusted, refining it to use under different circumstances.…”

Hareketler Teorisi Klasik Oyun Teorisinin Sağlayamadığı Neyi Sağlıyor? Hareketler Teorisinin Metodolojik Araçları Üzerine Bir Çalışma

“…Several scholars who made their analyses at structural level used the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken games to scrutinize the possibilities of international cooperation, collective security and international system (Snyder, 1971;Poundstone, 1993;Van Evera, 1985). Furthermore, many others used CGT to illuminate the strategic dynamics between two rational actors, and ignored the causalities that are generated by structure of international politics (Schelling, 1966;Snyder and Diesing., 1977;Zagare, 2014;Zagare, 1973;Sexton ve Dennis, 1985). In these studies, mostly states were considered as rational actor and included in the analyses.…”

The Dynamic Framework of Decision-Making

“…For modeling of Cuban missile crisis, we divide the period into 5 parts and in each period we examine static games with perfect information which had occurred. In return for a public US pledge not to invade Cuba and a private assurance that the US controlled missiles in Turkey would eventually be dismantled, the Soviets agreed to withdraw the missiles [16].…”