A Game Theoretical Approach to Hacktivism: Is Attack Likelihood a Product of Risks and Payoffs?

Abstract

The current study examines hacktivism (i.e., hacking to convey a moral, ethical, or social justice message) through a general game theoretic framework-that is, as a product of costs and benefits. Given the inherent risk of carrying out a hacktivist attack (e.g., legal action, imprisonment), it would be rational for the user to weigh these risks against perceived benefits of carrying out the attack. As such, we examined computer science students' estimations of risks, payoffs, and attack likelihood through a game theoretic design. Furthermore, this study aims at constructing a descriptive profile of potential hacktivists, exploring two predicted covariates of attack decision making, namely, peer prevalence of hacking and sex differences. Contrary to expectations, results suggest that participants' estimations of attack likelihood stemmed solely from expected payoffs, rather than subjective risks. Peer prevalence significantly predicted increased payoffs and attack likelihood, suggesting an underlying descriptive norm in social networks. Notably, we observed no sex differences in the decision to attack, nor in the factors predicting attack likelihood. Implications for policymakers and the understanding and prevention of hacktivism are discussed, as are the possible ramifications of widely communicated payoffs over potential risks in hacking communities.

Wishing to be like the character on screen: Media exposure and perception of hacking behavior

“…Given these previous findings, we developed several additional hypotheses regarding the application of the Game Theory model to wishful identification and perceptions of hacking behavior. First, as Bodford and Kwan (2018) found, we expect perceived payoffs to be positively correlated with estimations of willingness to hack in both hacktivism and in our added financial hacking condition (H4). Second, we expect perceived payoffs to mediate the hypothesized relation between wishful identification and estimations of willingness to hack (H5).…”

“…motivated by social or political beliefs). The present study seeks to replicate Bodford and Kwan's (2018) hacktivism findings, and expand the research to incorporate willingness to engage in hacking for financial gain.…”

“…A recent study applying Game Theory to hacking behaviors yielded a surprising finding, suggesting that, contrary to the broader theoretical framework of Game Theory, people responding to a call to hack may not always be rational decisionmakers (Bodford & Kwan, 2018). In that study, risks were defined as consequences such as getting caught and punished by authorities as an individual or as a group of hackers.…”

“…In that study, risks were defined as consequences such as getting caught and punished by authorities as an individual or as a group of hackers. In contrast, payoffs were defined as perceived benefits to oneself and/or others as a result of the behavior (Bodford & Kwan, 2018). When asked to predict a third party's action after being presented with a risky (but potentially advantageous) situation, college students' estimations of their willingness to hack stemmed solely from their perceived payoffs of the behavior.…”

“…Their willingness to hack was not related to their perception of risks underlying the hacking situation. For segments of our population, such risky decisions may be payoffdriven, rather than based on a deliberate calculation of the ratio of benefits to potential risks (Bodford & Kwan, 2018). It should be noted that this study examined willingness to engage in hacktivism (i.e.…”