A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function

Garson, Justin

doi:10.1086/692146

Cited by 68 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…A backward-looking account, equally consistent with ITSNTS thinking and perhaps more in line with something like William's Principle (19) can also be entertained. Such explanations answer a different explanatory question: they explain why the pattern has the properties it has, and they do so by referring to the function of those properties as past selected effects (77). The evolution of patterns of interaction is premised on some patterns persisting longer than others as a result of certain properties.…”

Section: Itnsts Beyond Microbial Communitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Processes and patterns of interaction as units of selection: An introduction to ITSNTS thinking

Doolittle

Inkpen

2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Many practicing biologists accept that nothing in their discipline makes sense except in the light of evolution, and that natural selection is evolution's principal sense-maker. But what natural selection actually is (a force or a statistical outcome, for example) and the levels of the biological hierarchy (genes, organisms, species, or even ecosystems) at which it operates directly are still actively disputed among philosophers and theoretical biologists. Most formulations of evolution by natural selection emphasize the differential reproduction of entities at one or the other of these levels. Some also recognize differential persistence, but in either case the focus is on lineages of material things: even species can be thought of as spatiotemporally restricted, if dispersed, physical beings. Few consider-as "units of selection" in their own right-the processes implemented by genes, cells, species, or communities. "It's the song not the singer" (ITSNTS) theory does that, also claiming that evolution by natural selection of processes is more easily understood and explained as differential persistence than as differential reproduction. ITSNTS was formulated as a response to the observation that the collective functions of microbial communities (the songs) are more stably conserved and ecologically relevant than are the taxa that implement them (the singers). It aims to serve as a useful corrective to claims that "holobionts" (microbes and their animal or plant hosts) are aggregate "units of selection," claims that often conflate meanings of that latter term. But ITSNS also seems broadly applicable, for example, to the evolution of global biogeochemical cycles and the definition of ecosystem function.

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Section: Itnsts Beyond Microbial Communitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Processes and patterns of interaction as units of selection: An introduction to ITSNTS thinking

Doolittle

Inkpen

2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…While natural selection is the most obvious mechanism that gives rise to S‐Functions, several theorists (e.g., Millikan, ; Papineau, ) have argued that any process in which a trait aids in the reproduction or replication of its bearer when compared with alternative traits, including cultural and linguistic evolution and “trial and error” learning, can generate S‐Functions. More recently, Garson (, ) has argued for a more liberal notion of selection in which the S‐Function of a trait can be defined by its contribution to the persistence rather than the replication of its bearer within a population. Garson's account, therefore, allows S‐Functions to be attributed to non‐replicating processes that, nonetheless, involves selection between different alternatives such as neural selection or, in the case of imitation, the selection of specific behaviours.…”

Section: The Possible Functions Of Imitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interestingly, Heyes () points towards Tinbergen's () concept of four essential forms of biological explanation, which separates a trait's evolution from its function (sometimes referred to as its survival value). It is important to note that one way that Tinbergen's distinction between evolutionary origin and function can be maintained is that, on Garson's (, ) liberal notion of S‐Function, it is perfectly possible for imitative behaviour to be assigned an S‐Function based on a selective process other than genetic evolution, for example, via the selection of specific motor commands within the brain. This allows for functions to be assigned to imitative SMCs even on the ASL account of imitation by saying that Tinbergen's evolutionary explanation of imitative SMCs would rely on the importance of strong sensorimotor neural connections for the regulation of one's actions, while the functional explanation would be concerned with the factors that lead to the selective deployment of imitative SMCs during social interaction.…”

Section: The Possible Functions Of Imitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The functions of imitative behaviour in humans

2018

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This article focuses on the question of the function of imitation and whether current accounts of imitative function are consistent with our knowledge about imitation's origins. We first review theories of imitative origin concluding that empirical evidence suggests that imitation arises from domain‐general learning mechanisms. Next, we lay out a selective account of function that allows normative functions to be ascribed to learned behaviours. We then describe and review four accounts of the function of imitation before evaluating the relationship between the claim that imitation arises out of domain‐general learning mechanisms and theories of the function of imitation.

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“…There is significant precedent for relying on a notion of function for to this end. Later Dretske (1988) and many of his interlocutors rely on a notion of biological functions as selected by evolution or learning [13,14,16,[27][28][29]. Whether and how this idea can be coherently spelled out is beyond scope here.…”

Section: Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural information, factivity and nomicity

Baker

2021

Biol Philos

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Biological and cognitive sciences rely heavily on the idea of information transmitted between natural events or processes. This paper critically assesses some current philosophical views of natural information and defends a view of natural information as Nomic and Factive. Dretske (1981) offered a Factive view of information, and recent work on the topic has tended to reject this aspect of his view in favor of a non-Factive, probabilistic approach. This paper argues that the reasoning behind this move to non-Factivity is flawed and mixes up different problems with Dretske's original view. I show that one of these problems -strictness -has to do with Nomicity rather than Factivity. The other problem -reference class ambiguity -is not solvable just in terms of a theory of natural information. On the Dretske-inspired view I defend, natural information is Factive and Nomic but is insufficient to determine the cognitive or biological content of a natural process. In sum I present an examination what natural information is and what role it can (and cannot) play in our understanding of living and thinking things.

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A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function

Cited by 68 publications

References 54 publications

Processes and patterns of interaction as units of selection: An introduction to ITSNTS thinking

Processes and patterns of interaction as units of selection: An introduction to ITSNTS thinking

The functions of imitative behaviour in humans

Natural information, factivity and nomicity

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