1993
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1993.tb00549.x
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"A Gradual and Moderate Relaxation": Eisenhower and the Revision of American Export Control Policy, 1953?1955

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Cited by 14 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The president, moreover, 'kept the US policy review moving towards a revision that would allow the United States and the Western Europeans to find as much common ground as possible'. 4 This essay, by contrast, contends that the narrow focus of both Forland and Spaulding on the effectiveness of Eisenhower's leadership in US embargo policy neglects other, perhaps more significant, factors which contributed to the revision of international East-West trade controls. In particular, the Churchill government's determination to limit the strategic embargo to items of a strictly strategic nature through the 'short list' initiative was crucial to the August 1954 revisions.…”
mentioning
confidence: 88%
“…The president, moreover, 'kept the US policy review moving towards a revision that would allow the United States and the Western Europeans to find as much common ground as possible'. 4 This essay, by contrast, contends that the narrow focus of both Forland and Spaulding on the effectiveness of Eisenhower's leadership in US embargo policy neglects other, perhaps more significant, factors which contributed to the revision of international East-West trade controls. In particular, the Churchill government's determination to limit the strategic embargo to items of a strictly strategic nature through the 'short list' initiative was crucial to the August 1954 revisions.…”
mentioning
confidence: 88%
“…In July 1953 NSC 152/2 advocated the continuation of tighter controls on trade with China than on trade with other Communist states. 105 Although such a measure had been introduced originally to force China to end the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration found a strong rationale for continuing the embargo; it considered that the tight sanctions against China would force Beijing to ask for significant aid from Moscow, which would not be able to meet China's demands, and thus cause intra-alliance friction. 106 …”
Section: Us Perception Of Reward Power and Its Pursuit Of Coercive Wementioning
confidence: 99%