A Graph-Theoretic Network Security Game

Mavronicolas, Marios; Papadopoulou, Vicky; Philippou, Anna; Spirakis, Paul G.

doi:10.1007/11600930_98

Cited by 24 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In particular, we represent the network's topology using a graph and adopt a security game introduced in [MPPS05c]. According to this approach, the security threats and the potential defence mechanisms are realized by a set of confronting players on a graphical game.…”

Section: The Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3) Validation of the non-functional security requirement: We utilize the Nash equilibria identified and evaluated in [MPPS05c] to measure the security guarantee in the prospective network for both approaches. These represent a reduced set of test scenarios to be evaluated.…”

Section: The Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent work by [KO04,ACY05] and [MPPS05b,MPPS05c], initiated the introduction of strategic games on graphs (and the study of their associated Nash equilibria) as a means of studying security problems in networks with selfish entities. By selfish we mean that each entity in the game aims to maximize its utility.…”

Section: Wwwintechopencommentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The ultimate safety of each player may depend in a complex way on the actions of the entire population. [MPPS05b,MPPS05c] considers a security problem on a distributed network modeled as a multi-player non-cooperative game with attackers (e.g., viruses) and a defender (e.g., a security software) entities. More specifically, there are two classes of confronting randomized players on a graph:  attackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize the probability of being caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and gains the expected number of attackers it kills.…”

Section: Wwwintechopencommentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nonfunctional Requirements Validation Using Nash Equilibria

Gregoriades¹,

Papadopoulou²

2010

Management and Services

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Section: The Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Wwwintechopencommentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Wwwintechopencommentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nonfunctional Requirements Validation Using Nash Equilibria

Gregoriades¹,

Papadopoulou²

2010

Management and Services

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“…An extensive collection of trade-offs between price of defense and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria is provided in the work of Mavronicolas et al [64]. Most interestingly, the work of Mavronicolas et al [64,[66][67][68] introduce certain natural classes of Nash equilibria for their network security game on graphs, including matching Nash equilibria [67,68] and perfect matching Nash equilibria [64]; they prove that deciding the existence of equilibria from such classes is precisely equivalent to the recognition problem for König-Egervary graphs [25,54]. So, this establishes a very interesting (and perhaps unexpected) link to some classical pearls in graph theory.…”

Section: A Network Security Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Algorithmic Game Theory and Applications

Nayak

2007

Handbook of Applied Algorithms

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Most of the existing and foreseen complex networks, such as the Internet, are operated and built by thousands of large and small entities (autonomous agents), which collaborate to process and deliver end-to-end flows originating from and terminating at any of them. The distributed nature of the Internet implies a lack of coordination among its users. Instead, each user attempts to obtain maximum performance according to his own parameters and objectives.Methods from game theory and mathematical economics have been proven to be a powerful modeling tool, which can be applied to understand, control, and efficiently design such dynamic, complex networks. Game theory provides a good starting point for computer scientists in their endeavor to understand selfish rational behavior in complex networks with many agents (players). Such scenarios are readily modeled using techniques from game theory, where players with potentially conflicting goals participate in a common setting with well-prescribed interactions.Nash equilibrium [73,74] distinguishes itself as the predominant concept of rationality in noncooperative settings. So, game theory and its various concepts of equilibria provide a rich framework for modeling the behavior of selfish agents in these kinds of distributed or networked environments; they offer mechanisms to achieve efficient and desirable global outcomes in spite of the selfish behavior.Mechanism design, a subfield of game theory, asks how one can design systems so that agents' selfish behavior results to desired systemwide goals. Algorithmic mechanism design additionally considers computational tractability to the set of concerns of mechanism design. Work on algorithmic mechanism design has focused on the complexity of centralized implementations of game-theoretic mechanisms for distributed optimization problems. Moreover, in such huge and heterogeneous networks, each agent does not have access to (and may not process) complete information. 286 ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND APPLICATIONSThe notion of bounded rationality for agents and the design of corresponding incomplete-information distributed algorithms have been successfully utilized to capture the aspect of lack of global knowledge in information networks.In this chapter, we review some of the most thrilling algorithmic problems and solutions, and corresponding advances, achieved on the account of game theory. The areas addressed are the following.Congestion games A central problem arising in the management of large-scale communication networks is that of routing traffic through the network. However, due to the large size of these networks, it is often impossible to employ a centralized traffic management. A natural assumption to make in the absence of central regulation is that network users behave selfishly and aim at optimizing their own individual welfare. One way to address this problem is to model this scenario as a noncooperative multiplayer game and formalize it using congestion game. Congestion games (either unweighted or weighted) offer ...

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Could firewall rules be public – a game theoretical perspective

Liao

Striegel

2011

Security Comm Networks

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Firewalls are among the most important components in network security. Traditionally, the rules of the firewall are kept private under the assumption that privacy of the ruleset makes attacks on the network more difficult. We posit that this assumption is no longer valid in the Internet of today due to two factors: the emergence of botnets reducing probing difficulty and second, the emergence of distributed applications where private rules increase the difficulty of troubleshooting. We argue that the enforcement of the policy is the key, not the secrecy of the policy itself. In this paper, we demonstrate through the application of game theory that public firewall rules when coupled with false information (lying) are actually better than keeping firewall rules private, especially when taken in the larger group context of the Internet. Interesting scenarios arise when honest, public firewalls are socially insured by other lying firewalls and networks adopting public firewalls become mutually beneficial to each other. The equilibrium under multiple‐network game is socially optimal because the percentage of required lying firewalls in social optimum is much smaller than the percentage in single‐network equilibrium and the chance of attacking through firewalls is further reduced to zero. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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A Graph-Theoretic Network Security Game

Cited by 24 publications

References 9 publications

Nonfunctional Requirements Validation Using Nash Equilibria

Nonfunctional Requirements Validation Using Nash Equilibria

Algorithmic Game Theory and Applications

Could firewall rules be public – a game theoretical perspective

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