A grounding solution to the grounding problem

Abstract

The statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it fail to share all of their kind and modal properties. Therefore, by Leibniz's Law, the statue is not the lump. Question: What grounds the kind and modal differences between the statue and the lump? In virtue of what is it that the lump of clay, but not the statue, can survive being smashed? This is the grounding problem. Now a number of solutions to the grounding problem require that we substantially revise our view of reality. In this paper, I provide a solution to the grounding problem that does not require such a revision. I then show how my solution to the grounding problem can solve a related problem and answer a related question. The upshot is that the solution I offer is not only non-revisionary, but also fruitful.Consider what is now a familiar problem concerning the statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it. Both fail to share all of their kind and modal properties and are therefore, by Leibniz's Law, not identical. They are, however, very much alike.They share all of their proper parts (at least at the microphysical level) and have the same shape, weight, mass, etc. Question: What grounds the kind and modal differences between the statue and the lump? In virtue of what is it that the lump, but not the statue, can survive being smashed? This is the grounding problem. 1 Borrowing terms from Karen Bennett's 2004 paper, when it comes to the grounding problem, there are the no-thingers, the one-thingers, and the multi-thingers. The 1 Kit Fine (2003) has developed a number of new Leibniz's Law arguments in favor of thinking that the statue is not the lump that do not rely on the traditional kind and modal differences. Call the kind of differences Fine relies on 'Finean-differences'. In §2.5, I show why my solution to the traditional differences between the statue and the lump is also a solution to these Finean-differences.

Mereological Nominalism

“…I believe similar regresses will arise for other answers e.g. using differing identity properties [deRosset ] or grounding relations [Saenz ; Korman : 212‐16] instead of intentional relations. Other solutions have different problems. Hylomorphism [Fine ; Koslicki ] (and similar theories [Paul ]) say that s and l 's differing properties are explained by their having different properties as proper parts (e.g.…”

“…I believe similar regresses will arise for other answers e.g. using differing identity properties [deRosset ] or grounding relations [Saenz ; Korman : 212‐16] instead of intentional relations.…”

Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects

“…20 Quasi-nihilists like Merricks (2001) and van Inwagen (1990) make exceptions, the former for objects with non-redundant causal powers and the latter for organisms; but neither accept that there are statues or lumps. 21 For more on what's really at issue in the puzzle, see Saenz, 2015. Saenz uses examples that are composite, but it's easy to see how the features of the puzzle he considers apply to mereologically simple objects. 22 When presenting this paper, SIMPLE PUZZLE involved a simple that was sculpted into a statue, which more closely mirrors the original puzzle.…”

“…For more on what's really at issue in the puzzle, see Saenz, . Saenz uses examples that are composite, but it's easy to see how the features of the puzzle he considers apply to mereologically simple objects.…”

Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)

“…See, e.g.,Saenz (2015) for a recent and interesting attempt to do this. And seeCameron (2014) for an attempt to explain away the weirdness of many-one colocation.…”