A Heuristic Evolutionary Game Theoretic Methodology for Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater Resources

Abstract

In this paper, a methodology based on a new heuristic evolutionary game is developed to determine evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESE) strategies for conjunctive surface and groundwater allocation to water users with conflicting objectives. The methodology provides reasonable and realistic framework to illuminate noncooperative behaviors of water users in the joint usage of surface and groundwater resources. The developed heuristic evolutionary game theoretic approach can be used for finding equilibrium in asymmetric n-person games with continuous strategies. The penalty function is provided in a way that it can control groundwater table drawdown at monitoring points. It is also shown that applying the proposed penalty function may inhibit the water users' excessive exploitation and can consequently avoid the tragedy of commons. As the methodology needs to run water allocation optimization and groundwater simulation models for several times, an optimization model based on genetic algorithms is linked with MODFLOW groundwater simulation model. Furthermore, a computational cost reduction method has been used to reduce the computation time caused by several consecutive computational steps in the proposed Water Resour Manage

Complementary Vantage Points: Integrating Hydrology and Economics for Sociohydrologic Knowledge Generation

“…However, they may instead neglect misaligned user incentives. Nonetheless, an increasing body of recent research combines both approaches to generate important new insights (Madani & Dinar, ; Müller, Müller‐Itten, et al, ; Parsapour‐Moghaddam et al, ). The example of groundwater overuse, taken from the field of water resources management, suggests that sociohydrologists have much to gain from stronger cross‐disciplinary interaction with economists when studying coupled human‐water systems.…”

“…First, most previous economic studies heavily idealize groundwater flows, whereas realistic representations of groundwater flows are often critical to understand user incentives. To our knowledge, two existing studies couple high‐fidelity (finite difference) numeric aquifer models and game theory (Müller, Müller‐Itten, et al, ; Parsapour‐Moghaddam et al, ). Both studies showed that user incentives are governed by complex groundwater flow patterns that would be missed by simpler models.…”

System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Quality Supervision Among Construction Stakeholders

“…Compared with classical game theory, evolutionary game theory combines game theory with dynamic evolution process analysis, and it focuses more on the dynamics of strategy change (Weibull 1997). Evolutionary game theory aims at finding stable strategies in any area with conflict of interests (Parsapour-Moghaddam et al 2015). Tripartite stakeholders involved in quality supervision are bounded and rational, and they change and adjust their strategies dynamically by observing and comparing payoffs with others.…”

Basin-scale multi-objective simulation-optimization modeling for conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater in northwest China

“…Evolutionary algorithms have been integrated with simulation model to tackle intricate SW and GW management model due to the effectiveness of solving non-linear and multimodal optimization problems (McPhee and Yeh, 2004;Yang, et al, 2009;Safavi and Esmikhani, 2013;Singh and Panda, 2013;Rothman and Mays, 2013;Wu et al, 2014;Parsapour-Moghaddam et al, 2015;Wu et al, 2016). Yang et al (2009) considered conflicting bi-objectives with the conjunctive use of GW and SW to achieve optimal pumping and recharge schemes.…”