Capital Markets and Corporate Governance 1994
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198287889.003.0006
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A Larger Role for Institutional Investors

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
9
0

Year Published

1997
1997
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7
2

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 18 publications
(9 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
9
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In fact, the very challenge to create a better and healthy atmosphere in the business arena seems to rest on the health of its corporate governance mechanism. Regarding the commercial ambience or local business environment of a country, Charkham (1994) has summed up with his intuitive insight that government arrangements in the business sector not only make up a crucial part of an institutional framework but also are an economic necessity, a political requirement and a moral imperative on which rests the commercial success and economic prosperity of a country.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, the very challenge to create a better and healthy atmosphere in the business arena seems to rest on the health of its corporate governance mechanism. Regarding the commercial ambience or local business environment of a country, Charkham (1994) has summed up with his intuitive insight that government arrangements in the business sector not only make up a crucial part of an institutional framework but also are an economic necessity, a political requirement and a moral imperative on which rests the commercial success and economic prosperity of a country.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the Shareholder Theory, we have: (i) The Principal-Agent or Finance Model, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Manne, 1965), which states that the purpose of a corporation is the maximisation of shareholders' profits as they (the shareholders) are the owners of the corporations and bear the highest risks but there are agency problem. (ii) The Myopic Market Model (Charkham 1994a(Charkham , 1994b(Charkham and 1989Sykes, 1994), which states that the purpose of a corporation is the maximisation of shareholders' profits but corporations are concerned with short-term market value, and sacrifice the long-term value of the company. On the Stakeholder Theory, the models include: (iii) The Executive Power Model (Hutton, 1995;Kay and Silberston, 1995), which claims that the purpose of a corporation is the maximisation of corporate wealth as whole but this creates the problem of the abuse of directors' power for their own self-interest and (iv) The Stakeholder Model (Freeman, 1984;Evan and Freeman, 1993;Blair, 1995), which leads to the maximisation of stakeholders' wealth, but with an absence of stakeholder involvement in the running of the company.…”
Section: The Four Competing Models Of Corporate Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even the observation that one half of publicly traded stocks are in the hands of institutions does not much mitigate weak shareholder control of directors: the proportion is not so high by international comparison. 11 The 1990s were characterized by considerable shareholder acquiescence in sloppy corporate governance. 12 Onto this culture was grafted a long period of stock market boom in which, provided shares in a company continued to rise, it made no sense for a fund manager to break ranks and sell shares just because of worries over corporate governance.…”
Section: What Went Wrong?mentioning
confidence: 99%