A liberal realist answer to debunking skeptics: the empirical case for realism

Abstract

Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don't know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist's: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance. Debunking Arguments for Moral Anti-Realism Three Skeptical Accounts of Moral BeliefCan we ever know what is objectively right or wrong, good or bad? Moral realists answer yes. Anti-realists answer no: they believe that either there are no objective moral truths, or we have no knowledge of these truths.Anti-realists have often defended their position by appealing to one or another debunking explanation for moral beliefs. According to debunking explanations, our moral beliefs are chiefly or entirely produced by psychological mechanisms that are not suited to arriving at objective truths; hence, even if such truths exist, we probably don't know them. In principle, indefinitely many kinds of debunking theories are possible. For instance, if it turned out that your moral beliefs were implanted in your mind by a capricious hypnotist, those beliefs would thereby be 'debunked'. In practice, however, the debunking explanations seriously advanced have generally been of just three sorts.First, some hold that the moral beliefs of an individual are entirely a function of that individual's particular emotions and desires, understood as purely non-cognitive states. Thus, David Hume states that "morality is determined by sentiment" and that "to have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character." 1 Second, some say that our moral beliefs are chiefly or entirely the product of our particular culture. For example, those raised in strongly Christian or Islamic communities today often judge homosexuality to be morally wrong. But if they had been born in ancient Greece, they would more likely have accepted homosexuality. Furthermore, many theorists deny that our culture reflects any objective evaluative facts; it is just the set of practices that we happen to have adopted, no better or worse, objectively speaking, than any other set of practices. Third, in recent years, evolutionary explanations of moral attitudes have grown in popularity. For example, on the assumption that our genes influence our moral beliefs 4 (perhaps indirectly, perhaps through our emotions), we can understand why most Hume 1975, p. 289; 1992, p. 471 Dawkins 1989, ch. 12; Wright 1995, ch. 10; Ruse 1998, pp. 218-22. 4 1 people believe in a strong moral obligation to care for one's own children, but no parallel obligation to care for unrelated persons: in our evolutionary past, ancestors who accepted such an obligation tended to leave behind more survivin...

The dynamics of moral progress

“…In this section, I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a 'local' nature. I discuss Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell's thesis about the environmental conditions that favour moral progress (Buchanan & Powell, 2015, 2016, thereby adding another dimension to what I have said so far about the conditions of moral agency. I also discuss some examples of current developments that could qualify as moral progress or regress.…”

“…What I have said in the previous two paragraphs makes me believe that we have to refrain from making ‘global’ judgements about the occurrence of moral progress. Contra to Michael Huemer () and Steven Pinker (), I would not dare to say that globally speaking, humanity has made moral progress over the last centuries. The most we can do is argue for ‘local’ claims about the occurrence of moral progress or moral regress, such as the claims that the abolition of New World slavery constitutes an instance of moral progress and the recent rise of right‐wing populism in many European countries and in the United States an instance of moral regress…”

Old Wine in New Bottles

“…Since we assume REALISM, moral properties do exist, and at least some of our moral beliefs could, in principle, reliably track them (cf. FitzPatrick 2015;Huemer 2016;Wielenberg 2014). This would be enough to reject the claim that empirical evidence about the origins of our beliefs gives us sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all of our moral beliefs.…”

“…Bogardus 2016: 642f;Bengson 2015;Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014;Huemer 2016Huemer : 1987Huemer -1989. 13 Hence, debunkers have to consider CORRECT as a live option and realists would likely insist that, in an argument that begins with REALISM, debunkers first have to show that the realist's 'escape route' via CORRECT fails.…”

II—Objectivity and Idolatry

“…17 Huemer (2015) argues that the moral phenomenon includes a convergence over time towards liberal views, and that this convergence is the basis of an argument for objectivism. Since I doubt that such convergence is taking place, or for that matter, that we have a clear sense of what "liberalism" is, I do not count it as part of the explananda.…”