A Lightweight and Formally Secure Certificate Based Signcryption With Proxy Re-Encryption (CBSRE) for Internet of Things Enabled Smart Grid

Abstract

A smart grid is a new ecosystem, which is made by combining a number of smart Internet of Things (IoT) devices that manage wide energy sources by increasing the efficiency and reliability of the smart energy systems. As the IoT devices in the smart grid ecosystem generate a gigantic amount of data that needs to be stored and managed in the cloud server. On the other hand, the stored data in the cloud server can be accessible to a number of data users, therefore the data need authenticity and secrecy. Here, to fulfill the security requirements of such type of communication, signcryption with proxy re-encryption technique is the most suitable option where a semi-trusted third party can alter a ciphertext that has been encrypted for one user into another ciphertext without seeing the original content of the message. However, the existing signcryption with proxy re-encryption schemes for the smart grid environment is suffering from more bandwidth space and greater computational time requirements. Thus, in this paper, we propose a lightweight certificate-based signcryption with a proxy re-encryption (CBSRE) scheme for smart grid based-IoT devices with the intention of reducing the computational and communicational costs. For the security and efficiency of the proposed CBSRE scheme, we used a hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem that uses small parameters with a key size of 80-bits. Furthermore, the proposed scheme provides the security requirements of confidentiality (IND-CBSRE-CCA2-I and IND-CBSRE-CCA2-II), unforgeability (EUF-CBSRE-CMA-I and EUF-CBSRE-CMA-II) and forward secrecy. Additionally, we compared our proposed CBSRE scheme with the existing proxy signcryption with re-encryption schemes and the final results show that the new scheme provides strong security with the expanse of minimal computational and communications resources.

A Novel Efficient Certificateless Signature Scheme for the Prevention of Content Poisoning Attack in Named Data Networking-Based Internet of Things

“…One part of the pair is called the secret value and the other part is called the partial private key. The secret value is randomly selected by the user, but the partial private key is calculated by KGC using its master secret key [18]. To authenticate the message, the signature generation algorithm requires both the keys of the user such as the secret value and the partial private key.…”

“…Note: the methods described above are mostly based on the concept of BPRG and ECC and therefore maintain high-cost complexities [18]. In addition, the schemes [26]- [36] do not have a concrete solution to their proposed applications.…”

“…The curve with the genus (G = 1) is known as ECC. The HCC with (G≽2) is shown in Figure 3 [18]. Additionally, the group order of the finite field ( ) for (G = 1) requires at least 160-bit operands, which requires at least ( .…”

“…To test the simulation results, a workstation with the features used are mentioned in Table 3 [22,61]. Due to the smaller key size of 80 bits, ℳ ℋ is estimated to be 0.48milliseconds [18,37].…”

A Lightweight Nature Heterogeneous Generalized Signcryption (HGSC) Scheme for Named Data Networking-Enabled Internet of Things

“…However, ζ cannot replay the old messages because he/she needs fresh FNs for every new session. Furthermore, we compare our scheme with the existing CGS and ID-BGS schemes in milliseconds (ms) by using the above major operation, according to the experiments performed in [50] with the following hardware and software specifications: [50], an SPBPM will take 4.32 ms, a single SBP will take 14.90 ms, SEXP will take 1.25 ms, and SEPM will take 0.97 ms. Based on the experiments performed in [51,52], we consider that a SHEDM will take 0.48 ms. On the bases of the above expansive mathematical operations, we conduct the computation cost comparison of our proposed scheme with existing CGS schemes which are Zhang et al [28], Zhou et al [29], Zhang et al [30], Zhou [31], Waheed et al [32], and Karati et al [33] as shown in Tables 2 and 3. Further, the computation cost comparison of our proposed scheme with existing ID-BGS schemes which are Wei et al [21] and Shen et al [23] is shown in Tables 4 and 5.…”