A Lightweight Identity-Based Signature Scheme for Mitigation of Content Poisoning Attack in Named Data Networking With Internet of Things

Abstract

Named Data Networking (NDN) is one of the future envisioned networking paradigm used to provide fast and efficient content dissemination with interest-based content retrieval, name-based routing and in-network content caching. On the one hand, this new breed of future Internet architecture is becoming a key technology for data dissemination in the IoT networks; on the other hand, NDN suffers from new challenges in terms of data security. Among them, a content poisoning attack is the most common data security challenge. The aim of this attack is to inject poisoned content with an invalid signature to the network. Therefore, to prevent NDN against possible content poisoning attack, a signature of the contents is appended to each data packet for verifications. In this paper, we propose an identity-based signature scheme for IoT-based NDN networks, with a special emphasis on content integrity and authenticity. The proposed scheme is based on the concept of the Hyperelliptic curves, which provide the same level of security as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Bilinear pairing and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) with lower-key size. The proposed scheme is subject to both formal and informal security analysis in order to show the feasibility of our scheme. Finally, the performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed via comparison with the relevant existing schemes that authenticates the superiority of our scheme in terms of security and efficiency. INDEX TERMS Content poisoning attack, named data networking (NDN), Internet of Things, identity-based signature.

A Novel Efficient Certificateless Signature Scheme for the Prevention of Content Poisoning Attack in Named Data Networking-Based Internet of Things

“…To mitigate CPA, a number of proposals have been suggested in literature [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37]. However, none of the suggested proposals can effectively mitigate the CPA.…”

“…Recently in 2020, Ullah et al [37], proposed an OnDemand lightweight identity-based signature scheme for mitigation of CPA in NDN-based IoT, by using a lightweight HCC algorithm. According to the authors, a client and provider will register themselves with a network manager by sending their identities, the network manager then generates public and private keys by using their identities and send them to both.…”

“…To assess the impact, the given scheme was compared with seven relevant schemes proposed by Yeh et al [45], Karati et al [46], Zhang et al [47], Sajid et al [37], Nasrollah and Vanda [48], Rezaeibagha et al [49] and Thumbur et al [50]. The key points from our comparison are explained in Table 4.…”

“…To test the simulation results, a workstation with the features used are mentioned in Table 3 [22,61]. Due to the smaller key size of 80 bits, ℳ ℋ is estimated to be 0.48milliseconds [18,37].…”

A Lightweight Nature Heterogeneous Generalized Signcryption (HGSC) Scheme for Named Data Networking-Enabled Internet of Things

“…However, ζ cannot replay the old messages because he/she needs fresh FNs for every new session. Furthermore, we compare our scheme with the existing CGS and ID-BGS schemes in milliseconds (ms) by using the above major operation, according to the experiments performed in [50] with the following hardware and software specifications: [50], an SPBPM will take 4.32 ms, a single SBP will take 14.90 ms, SEXP will take 1.25 ms, and SEPM will take 0.97 ms. Based on the experiments performed in [51,52], we consider that a SHEDM will take 0.48 ms. On the bases of the above expansive mathematical operations, we conduct the computation cost comparison of our proposed scheme with existing CGS schemes which are Zhang et al [28], Zhou et al [29], Zhang et al [30], Zhou [31], Waheed et al [32], and Karati et al [33] as shown in Tables 2 and 3. Further, the computation cost comparison of our proposed scheme with existing ID-BGS schemes which are Wei et al [21] and Shen et al [23] is shown in Tables 4 and 5.…”