A Logic for ‘Because’

Schnieder, Benjamin

doi:10.1017/s1755020311000104

Cited by 201 publications

(55 citation statements)

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“…Nevertheless, an infinitesimal contribution is a contribution; and we see no harm 11 Cp. Schnieder (2008Schnieder ( , 2011, and also Correia (2010), andFine (2010, forthcoming). Note that Fine and Correia are concerned with grounding which they take to be an explanatory relation expressible by 'because'-sentences; see Fine (2001, p.…”

Section: Evaluating Case-by-rulementioning

confidence: 98%

Explanation by induction?

2012

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Philosophers of mathematics commonly distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. Are they explanatory? This paper addresses the question, based on general principles about explanation. First, a recent argument for a negative answer is discussed and rebutted. Second, a case is made for a qualified positive take on the issue. Keywords Mathematical induction · Mathematical explanation · Logic of explanation · GroundingIn the philosophy of mathematics it is commonplace to distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. The former explain why their conclusion is true, while the latter merely show that their conclusion is true. 1 An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. However, intuitions are divided about

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Section: Evaluating Case-by-rulementioning

confidence: 98%

Explanation by induction?

2012

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“…Perhaps, participation may be another form of constitution, or at least so it is sometimes assumed to be (Kim, 1976;Lombard, 1986;Bennett, 1988). Another option, if one thinks that events ontologically depend on objects (or the other way round) one may be to define it in terms of ontological dependence or grounding (Correia, 2005;Fine, 2012;Lowe, 1998;Schaffer, 2009;Schnieder, 2011) Participation may come in a loose and a strict sense. In the strict sense, I…”

Section: Eventsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence

Costa¹

2017

Journal of Philosophy

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“…Then we may ask with respect to this notion which of the features of a sentence's content the grounding operator < is sensitive to in the sense that sameness with respect to these features of content guarantees that two sentences may replace one another within the scope of < without changing the truth value. 4 Abstracting 3 The operator option is chosen, for example, by Fine (2012b), Correia (2010), and Schnieder (2011).…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, the truth that snow is white is taken to ground the truth that snow is white or snow is not white, but not the logically equivalent truth that grass is green or grass is not green. And the truth that snow is white or snow is not white in turn grounds the truth obtained by adding as a further disjunct 1 The pioneering contributions initiating this debate were Batchelor (2010); Correia (2010Correia ( , 2014a; Fine (2010Fine ( , 2012c; Rosen (2010);Schnieder (2011). More recent work includes Correia (2014b);deRosset (2013deRosset ( , 2014; Krämer (2013); Krämer and Roski (2015); Krämer and Roski (2016); Litland (2013Litland ( , 2016a; Poggiolesi (2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content

Krämer

2016

Synthese

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This is the penultimate version of an article accepted for publication by Synthese.Please quote only from the published version. The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com ABSTRACT. A lot of research has recently been done on the topic of ground, and in particular on the logic of ground. According to a broad consensus in that debate, ground is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equivalent truths may differ with respect to what grounds them, and what they ground. This renders pressing the question of what we may take to be the ground-theoretic content of a true statement, i.e. that aspect of the statement's overall content to which ground is sensitive. I propose a novel answer to this question, namely that ground tracks how, rather than just by what, a statement is made true. I develop that answer in the form of a formal theory of groundtheoretic content, show how the resulting framework may be used to articulate theories of ground, including in particular an attractive account of the grounds of truthfunctionally complex truths that has proved difficult to accommodate on alternative views of content.

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A Logic for ‘Because’

Cited by 201 publications

References 38 publications

Explanation by induction?

Explanation by induction?

The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence

Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content

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