A Low-Cost GPS Spoofing Detector Design for Internet of Things (IoT) Applications

Arafin, Tanvir; Anand, Dhananjay; Qu, Gang

doi:10.1145/3060403.3060455

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Many GNSS anti-spoofing countermeasures have been proposed, which were classified in a 2012 paper by Jafarnia-Jahromi et al in [17]. These broadly rely either upon GNSSspecific factors such as measuring clock consistency [3] or correlating with other satellite signals, cryptographic authentication, or signal processing methods such as measuring signal quality or spatially correlating the received signals. However, countermeasures based on signal processing methods are considered impractical in most contexts, since GNSS is often implemented in cheap embedded hardware.…”

Section: A Gnss Spoofingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Firefly: Spoofing Earth Observation Satellite Data through Radio Overshadowing

Salkield,

Köhler,

Birnbach

et al. 2023

Proceedings 2023 Workshop on Security of Space and Satellite Systems

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Data from Earth Observation satellites has become crucial in private enterprises, research applications, and in coordinating national responses to events such as forest fires. These purposes are supported by data derived from a variety of satellites, some of which do not secure the wireless downlink channel effectively. This opens the door for modern adversaries to conduct spoofing attacks by overshadowing the signal with commercially available radio equipment.In this paper, we assess the vulnerability of current Earth Observation systems to spoofing attacks conducted at the physical layer. The effect of these attacks is amplified since the data is received at dedicated ground stations and distributed to hundreds of downstream systems, which are themselves not designed with security in mind. Specifically, we take NASA's live forest fire detection system as a case study, and demonstrate that the attacker can achieve arbitrary manipulation of fires in the derived dataset to trigger false emergency responses or mislead crisis analysis. We also assess the attack surface presented by ground station software which implicitly trusts data from the RF port. Against the NASA system we uncover several new vulnerabilities that can be exploited to stealthily deny service.We conclude with a discussion of physical-layer countermeasures to detect and defend against spoofing, which can be implemented in existing deployments at the ground station.

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Section: A Gnss Spoofingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Firefly: Spoofing Earth Observation Satellite Data through Radio Overshadowing

Salkield,

Köhler,

Birnbach

et al. 2023

Proceedings 2023 Workshop on Security of Space and Satellite Systems

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“…To provide local time reference based validation, [13,14] propose a method based on Kalman filters to track the clock and frequency offset between the GNSS receiver oscillator and an off-the-shelf, inexpensive temperature compensated oscillator (TCXO). The performance is measured based on the attack proposed in [22], where GNSS signals are progressively delayed, forcing the GNSS receiver to deviate from the ground truth time.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Without (guaranteed) network connectivity, time-based detection can rely on the on-board capabilities of an enhanced GNSS receiver, notably its on-board clock [9]. Adversaryinduced degradation of the time solution, manifesting itself as variations in the GNSS time rate and skewing, can be captured by taking advantage of on-board oscillators [13][14][15]. Intuitively, the progression of the GNSS receiver time should match the one provided by the local oscillator, if it is sufficiently stable during the period of observation [16,17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

Spanghero,

Papadimitratos

2022

Preprint

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A wide gamut of important applications rely on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for precise time and positioning. Attackers dictating the GNSS receiver position and time solution are a significant risk, especially due to the inherent vulnerability of GNSS systems. A first line of defense, for a large number of receivers, is to rely on additional information obtained through the rich connectivity of GNSS enabled platforms. Network time can be used for direct validation of the GNSS receiver time; but this depends on network availability. To allow attack detection even when there are prolonged network disconnections, we present a method based on on-board ensemble of reference clocks. This allows the receiver to detect sophisticated attacks affecting the GNSS time solution, independently of the specific attack methodology. Results obtained with Chip-Scale Oven Compensated Oscillators (CS-OCXO) are promising and demonstrate the potential of embedded ensembles of reference clocks, detecting attacks causing modifications of the receiver time offset as low as 0.3 µs, with half the detection latency compared to related literature.

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“…The University of Ontario have successfully implemented a method that identifies spoofing attacks by the strong correlation between spoofed satellites signal parameters due to the nature of single transmitter spoofing apparatus inability to fake the multipath channel nature of a true GPS constellation (Li & Wang, 2016). A low-cost defense implementation based on free-running crystal oscillator comparison to received GPS signal timing has been proposed for Internet of Things (IoT) devices in (Arafin et al, 2017). This method would require no additional RF components or advanced signal processing techniques.…”

Section: State-of-the-art Background On Gps Spoofingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of a GPS spoofing apparatus to attack a DJI Matrice 100 Quadcopter

Horton

Ranganathan

2018

J. Glob. Position. Syst.

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Global Positioning System (GPS) Spoofing attacks threaten technologies that our modern society depends on. To successfully develop defensive mechanisms against these attacks, methods to model the attacks and subsequently distinguish them from normal GPS operation must be developed. This paper primarily details the step-by-step implementation of a low-cost GPS spoofing and high-level spoofing data collection apparatus to model a simplistic spoofing attack that could be implemented with limited resources. The spoofing apparatus developed has been used to successfully attack a DJI Matrice 100 quadcopter and a portion of the collected spoofing data is presented.

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A Low-Cost GPS Spoofing Detector Design for Internet of Things (IoT) Applications

Cited by 22 publications

References 9 publications

Firefly: Spoofing Earth Observation Satellite Data through Radio Overshadowing

Firefly: Spoofing Earth Observation Satellite Data through Radio Overshadowing

High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

Development of a GPS spoofing apparatus to attack a DJI Matrice 100 Quadcopter

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