A Marriage of Convenience on the Rocks? Revisiting the Sino–Angolan Relationship

Abstract

China's relationship with Angola – which is both the region's top oil exporter to China and recipient of the highest amount of Chinese loans – represents a critical case when it comes to studying Sino–African relations. The Sino–Angolan relationship, forged for purely pragmatic reasons at an opportune moment of mutual need in the early 2000s, has been labelled a ‘marriage of convenience’. A variety of factors have, however, altered the environment in which China first made inroads into Angola; most notably a decline in oil prices, and the 2017 political transition. These have provided fresh impetus to the Angolan political economy and relations with China. Based on interviews we show that although oil remains a central ingredient, China's role has substantially evolved. The marriage of convenience is experiencing a period of rocky introspection, one in which the notion of China having sway in Angola can finally be laid to rest.

Introduction to the Handbook of African Economic Development

“…Chinese SOEs in the resource sector, for example, engage in what Lee (2017) calls "expansive accumulation," where profitability is an important imperative, but security of supply to the Chinese market (a political objective) is also important. However, it is important not to exaggerate the power of China on the continent (de Carvalho et al 2021). Government-to-government BRI deals can be sealed quickly, but these do not give China authority to lead in a broader sense (Deng 2022).…”

The Political Economy of Chinese Debt and International Monetary Fund Conditionality

“…Increasing global commodity prices eventually helped the country recover from this short-lived setback. Although the government successfully placed a $4 billion Eurobond in international financial markets in 2011 ( Jensen and Paulo 2011 ), Chinese lending significantly increased, and relations with Beijing intensified ( Corkin 2016 ;Acker, Bräutigam, and Huang 2020 ;de Carvalho, Kopi ński, and Taylor 2022 ). For instance, Acker, Bräutigam, and Huang (2020) estimate that between 2010 and 2014, Angola signed loan deals worth $11.2 billion with several Chinese lenders, whereby the major share of $10 billion could be attributed to Sanogol's commercial loans from China Development Bank (CDB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.…”

Same Same, but Different: Ghana’s Sinohydro Deal as Evolved ‘Angola Model’?

“…Furthermore, he points out, that western commentators overstate the influence of China in Angola. Nevertheless, de Carvalho, Kopiński, and Taylor (2021) argue that China responded to the criticism of the Angola Model and evolved their lending practices. In 2019, China shifted lending away from African countries that had recently restructured or reprofiled their debt.…”