A Mathematical Model of Communication with Reputational Concerns

Huang, Ce; Zhang, Yuanyuan; Lai, Chong

doi:10.1155/2016/6507104

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Chi and Hou [58] considered both ability reputation and cooperation reputation of incentive mechanism in project team members by using multiple methods. Huang et al [59] investigated a mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns where an expert provided a suggestion for two periods. Wagner et al [60] and Lu et al [61] explicitly pointed out that suppliers' reputation was important to the future relationship and collaboration between the owner and the supplier.…”

Section: Reputation Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Mechanism of Prefabrication in Mega Projects with Reputational Concerns

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As one of the most important sustainability project management practices, prefabrication has been drawing increasing attention to project construction practitioners. However, due to the needs of high technology and large capital investment, there is a great challenge for suppliers to adopt prefabrication in mega project construction. Therefore, designing an adequate incentive mechanism has become a daunting task for the project owner, which aims to ensure a socially and environmentally friendly project delivery. In this study, an incentive model with reputational concerns from the perspective of the project owner was established and how this incentive affects supplier's effort and project owner's profit was investigated. By contrasting to the incentive model without reputational concerns, when the reputation incentive is considered in the incentive contract, both supplier's effort and project owner's profit increase. In addition, adding reputation incentive implies more expenses, thus the project owner may not want to take this strategy due to the potential expense increase. Therefore, the study also considered an incentive mechanism with constant total incentive intensity. By comparison, the result shows that this strategy is also useful which can improve supplier's effort and project owner's profit.

show abstract