Adversarial models are well-established for cryptographic protocols, but distributed real-time protocols have requirements that these abstractions are not intended to cover. The IEEE/IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems for power utility automation in particular not only requires distributed processing, but in case of the generic object oriented substation events and sampled value (GOOSE/SV) protocols also hard real-time characteristics. This motivates the desire to include both quality of service (QoS) and explicit network topology in an adversary model based on a π-calculus process algebraic formalism based on earlier work. This allows reasoning over process states, placement of adversarial entities and communication behaviour. We demonstrate the use of our model for the simple case of a replay attack against the publish/subscribe GOOSE/SV subprotocol, showing bounds for non-detectability of such an attack.Index Terms-Adversary model, Quality of services, IEC 61850, Real-time communication protocols
I. INTRODUCTIONReal-time communication protocols are among the most prominent communication protocols used in networked critical infrastructures. They are used to monitor and control industrial automation processes deployed in critical infrastructures including power stations, power and water distribution, and traffic systems. The resilience of networked critical infrastructures is depended on the ability of the communication protocols used in such environments to adapt well in the face adversarial actions.Adversary model describes the capabilities of an attacker [1] and facilitates reasoning about how a system may be compromised. The conventional adversary models are not suitable for capturing the capabilities of an attacker in IEC 61850 environment due to the stringent QoS requirements and the network topology [2]. Also, the conventional adversary models do not consider the network topology of IEC 61850 because they assume that there is a point-to-point communication between all parties. Thus, it is important to develop an adversary model which takes into account the constraints imposed on an attacker with the intention of attacking the IEC 61850 real-time communication protocols.We therefore propose an adversary model for IEC 61850 real-time communication protocols in this paper. First, we use IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging service as an example, and derive its formalization using π−calculus variant. We then show that the relative positions of the adversary in relation to the publisher, event notification service, and subscriber determine the type of attacks that can be launched by an attacker. Lastly, we use our model to describe a reply attack that can result in a denial of service (DoS) attack.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a general discussion on real-time communication protocols and introduces the π−calculus syntax. Section III discusses the related works. Section IV describes the adversary model and its formalization using π−calculus variant. Section V pr...