A methodological argument against scientific realism

Abstract

First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.

Can Meaningless Statements Be Approximately True? On Relaxing the Semantic Component of Scientific Realism

“…epistemic thesis of scientific realism, which is normally understood to be similar to: scientific discourse is (probably) approximately true when it has played a significant role in issuing successful novel predictions. 3 Second is a methodological thesis that does not feature in most explicit formulations of scientific realism, but which Rowbottom (2017;2021) has recently highlighted and discussed. Psillos (1999: xxi) mentions this methodological thesis in the following passage:…”