A Metric for Quantifying UWB Ranging Error Due to Clock Drifts

Chen, Haige; Dhekne, Ashutosh

doi:10.1109/ipin54987.2022.9918104

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In practical systems, the clock frequency may deviate from its correct value in an irregular fashion, introducing clockdrift error to ranging measurements [48]. Here, we show that the formulation in ( 1) is accurate despite clock imperfections.…”

Section: A Unspoof-passive Rangingmentioning

confidence: 67%

“…Note that this formulation significantly mitigates the effect of clock drift without relying on any specific timing relationship between D T and D A unlike the IEEE 802.15.4a standard. For a detailed analysis of this and other similar formulations, and for understanding how reliance on specific timing relationships is detrimental to the overall ranging process, the reader is referred to [48]. In TWR, a malicious tag can spoof the measurement ρ AT simply by reporting untruthful timing information R T and D T .…”

Section: Unspoof System Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spoofing Evident and Spoofing Deterrent Localization Using Ultrawideband (UWB) Active–Passive Ranging

Chen,

Dhekne

2024

J. Ind. Sea. Pos. Nav.

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This paper presents UnSpoof, an ultrawideband (UWB) localization system that can detect and localize distance-spoofing tags with a few collaborative passively-receiving anchors. We propose novel formulations that enable passively-receiving anchors to deduce their time-of-flight (ToF) and time-difference-of-arrival (TDoA) just by overhearing standard two-way ranging (TWR) messages between the tag and one active anchor. Our ToF formulation can be used to precisely localize an honest tag, and to detect a distance-spoofing tag that falsely reports its timestamps. Additionally, our TDoA formulation enables spoofing deterrent localization, which can be used to track down and apprehend a malicious tag. Our experimental evaluation shows 30 cm 75 th percentile error for ToF-based honest tag localization, and sub-meter error for TDoA-based localization for spoofing tags. We demonstrate successful detection of distance reduction and enlargement attacks inside the anchors' convex hull, and graceful degradation outside. Additionally, we show the effects of a non-regular geometry of anchors and invite researchers and practitioners to experiment with anchor topologies of interest to them via our open source modeling software.

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Section: A Unspoof-passive Rangingmentioning

confidence: 67%

Section: Unspoof System Designmentioning

confidence: 99%