A million answers to twenty questions: Choosing by checklist

Abstract

Several decision models in marketing science and psychology assume that a consumer chooses by proceeding sequentially through a checklist of desirable properties. These models are contrasted to the utility maximization model of rationality in economics. We show on the contrary that the two approaches are nearly equivalent. Since the number of preference discriminations that an agent can make increases exponentially in the number of properties used, checklists provide a rapid procedural basis for utility maximization.

State dependent choice

“…Finally, note that even the choice-observational correspondence between choice by salient considerations and environmental states is due to our assumption that properties are satisfied in a 0 − 1 fashion (together with the bridging result of MMM [40]). For example, in a variation of our model in which each property can be satisfied in various degrees represented by a partial order (i.e.…”

“…Given the collection Σ of all nonempty subsets of X, a choice function is a correspondence c that associates with each A ∈ Σ (a menu) a nonempty set c(A) ⊆ A, the agent's observed selection from A. To build a model of state dependent choice, we begin by assuming, as in Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti [40] (MMM), that the agent makes choices by sequentially going through a checklist of 'properties' of alternatives (properties are intended as synonymous with 'attributes'). At each step, he discards the alternatives that lack the relevant property.…”

“…Proposition 1 (MMM, [40]): A choice function c has a checklist if and only if it maximises a preference. 6 A choice function may be a menu driven state dependent choice even if it has no checklist (see appendix 1).…”

“…In general, following a list of desirable properties, the agent progressively eliminates at each stage alternatives that do not possess the relevant property, until a set of acceptable alternatives is found. 1 This is a case of 'sequentially rationalisable choice' (Manzini and Mariotti [41]) and we showed in Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti [40] (henceforth MMM) that the decisions resulting from this type of procedure are indistinguishable from those of a standard utility maximising agent. In other words, MMM cannot explain any violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP).…”

Partial knowledge restrictions on the two-stage threshold model of choice

“…To give this enterprise some concreteness, we shall commit to a particular model of how choices are determined by the Cherepanov et al [8], and Masatlioglu and Nakajima [20] on search and consideration sets; and Mandler et al [15], Manzini and Mariotti [17], and Bajraj andÜlkü [4] on procedural models. 4 The observer might be able to determine salience levels, say, using knowledge of the physiology of vision and the spatial arrangement of the choice alternatives.…”