A mixed game of timing: investigation of strategies

Radzik, Tadeusz; Orłowski, Krzysztof

doi:10.4064/am-17-3-409-430

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…For example, in tactical security scenarios it is important to jump to action at the right time to avoid a loss of money or even human life (see, for example, timing of interventions in international conflicts). To understand these scenarios, so-called games of timing have been studied with the tools of non-cooperative game theory since the cold war era (see, for example, [11,14]). For a detailed survey and summary of the theoretical contributions in this area, we refer the interested reader to [10].…”

Section: Games Of Timingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigation of Targeted and Non-targeted Covert Attacks as a Timing Game

Lászka

Johnson

Großklags

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We consider a strategic game in which a defender wants to maintain control over a resource that is subject to both targeted and nontargeted covert attacks. Because the attacks are covert, the defender must choose to secure the resource in real time without knowing who controls it. Each move by the defender to secure the resource has a one-time cost and these defending moves are not covert, so that a targeted attacker may time her attacks based on the defender's moves. The time between when a targeted attack starts and when it succeeds is given by an exponentially distributed random variable with a known rate. Non-targeted attackers are modeled together as a single attacker whose attacks arrive following a Poisson process. We find that in this regime, the optimal moving strategy for the defender is a periodic strategy, so that the time intervals between consecutive moves are constant.

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Section: Games Of Timingmentioning

confidence: 99%