10th IET System Safety and Cyber-Security Conference 2015 2015
DOI: 10.1049/cp.2015.0293
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A Model Based Approach For SCADA Safety And Security Joint Modelling: S-Cube

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Cited by 25 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A conflict resolutionis done based on weighting of resolutions values for conflicted requirements. 12) Kriaa et al (2015) [25] present an approach for joint risk assessment that can be applied for both design and operational phases of the system development. The S-cube (SCADA Safety and Security modelling) approach takes as input the system architecture and provides attacks and failures scenarios that may lead to given hazards.…”
Section: ) Raspotning Et Al (2012) [10] Present Combined Harmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These approaches have however the advantage to quantify the likelihood and severity of resulting attacks. In [12], Kriaa et al define four criteria to classify approaches combining security and safety:…”
Section: Comparing To State-of-the-artmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They implement this approach with the KB3 [11] tool and apply it to the Stuxnet attack. In 2015, they publish S-CUBE [12], an implementation of the former approach in the Figaro language. This approach takes into account the applicative logic of the process.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%