A model of egoistical relative deprivation.

Abstract

The present article examines the theory of relative deprivation. This theory states, basically, that objective and subjective well-being are not isomorphically related, so that sometimes the better-off one is, the worse-off one feels subjectively. After a brief review of work in the area of relative deprivation, a formal model is developed. It is argued that an individual feels resentment about failure to possess something (X) only when he sees that similar others possess X, he wants X, he feels entitled to possess X, he thinks that possession of X is feasible, and he does not blame himself for his failure to possess X. The antecedents of these conditions are explored, and the consequences of the emotion of relative deprivation are studied. Empirical evidence relating to the model is summarized briefly and is found to corroborate the model. Deprivation is relative, not absolute. People feel unjustly treated or inadequately compensated when they compare themselves to some standard of reference. Because deprivation is relative, it is often true that those who are the most deprived in an objective sense are not the ones most likely to experience deprivation. These are the essential concepts of the theory of relative deprivation. They find expression in common sense and anecdotal wisdom. DeTocqueville observed that "evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested" (quoted in Davies, 1962, p. 6). Karl Marx wrote:A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside Requests for reprints should be sent to Faye

Cooperating when “you” and “I” are treated fairly: The moderating role of leader prototypicality.

“…Motivated by such claims, fairness scholars have recently started to attend to the idea that procedural fairness experiences may be given more meaning when one also examines the fairness experiences of others. Thus, similar to earlier research on outcome fairness (e.g., Adams, 1965;Crosby, 1976), procedural fairness research has begun to highlight the role of social comparisons (Degoey, 2000;Jones & Skarlicki, 2005).…”

Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal attributes.

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“…Related attributes also influence one's reactions to comparisons that are imposed by the environment. An example comes from relative deprivation research, which suggests that people are most resentful about not having something when similar others have it (see Crosby, 1976, for a review). For example, "the wages of manual workers are more important in determining whether or not miners feel entitled to a pay increase than are the salaries of white-collar workers" (Crosby, 1976, p. 95).…”

Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory.

“…Furthermore, both theories tackle crucial questions concerning behavior in broader social contexts. It is of major interest to gain insight into how people may respond to their socially underprivileged positions, how they may try to improve their situation, and what in particular the antecedent conditions for collective action are (Crosby, 1976;Mark & Folger, 1984;see Lalonde & Cameron, 1994, for a detailed discussion of the conditions of collective action).…”