A Model of Onion Routing with Provable Anonymity

Feigenbaum, Joan; Johnson, Aaron M.; Syverson, Paul

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_9

Cited by 33 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…There have been analyses which focus on a particular AC protocol, such as Serjantov and Danezis (2002); Díaz (2006); Shmatikov and Wang (2006); Gierlichs et al (2008) for Mixnet, Bhargava and Palamidessi (2005); Andrés et al (2011) for DC-net, Díaz et al (2002); Shmatikov (2004) for Crowds, and Syverson et al (2000); Mauw et al (2004); Feigenbaum et al (2007a; for onion routing. Most of these study a particular anonymity property in a particular scenario and are not flexible enough to cover the emerging system-level attacks on the various AC protocols.…”

Section: Related and Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

AnoA: A Framework for Analyzing Anonymous Communication Protocols

Backes

Kate

Manoharan

et al. 2017

JPC

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Abstract. Anonymous communication (AC) protocols such as the widely used Tor network have been designed to provide anonymity over the Internet to their participating users. While AC protocols have been the subject of several security and anonymity analyses in the last years, there still does not exist a framework for analyzing these complex systems and their different anonymity properties in a unified manner.In this work we present AnoA: a generic framework for defining, analyzing, and quantifying anonymity properties for AC protocols. In addition to quantifying the (additive) advantage of an adversary in an indistinguishability-based definition, AnoA uses a multiplicative factor, inspired from differential privacy. AnoA enables a unified quantitative analysis of well-established anonymity properties, such as sender anonymity, sender unlinkability, and relationship anonymity. AnoA modularly specifies adversarial capabilities by a simple wrapper-construction, called adversary classes. We examine the structure of these adversary classes and identify conditions under which it suffices to establish anonymity guarantees for single messages in order to derive guarantees for arbitrarily many messages. This then leads us to the definition of Plug'n'Play adversary classes (PAC), which are easy-to-use, expressive, and satisfy this condition. We prove that our framework is compatible with the universal composability (UC) framework and show how to apply AnoA to a simplified version of Tor against passive adversaries, leveraging a recent realization proof in the UC framework.

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Section: Related and Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

AnoA: A Framework for Analyzing Anonymous Communication Protocols

Backes

Kate

Manoharan

et al. 2017

JPC

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show abstract

“…In [7], [1] and [14] the Onion-Routing (OR) [27] protocol is discussed; the authors present definitions for OR in the UC framework [8]. In [14], the model of Feigenbaum et al [13] is used. In [7] and [1] the authors further discuss the security properties required for OR cryptographic primitives, to achieve provable anonymity.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the limits of provable anonymity

Gelernter

Herzberg

2013

Proceedings of the 12th ACM Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society

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We study provably secure anonymity. We begin with rigorous definition of anonymity against wide range of computationally bounded attackers, including eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destinations, and their combinations. Following [21], our definition is generic, and captures different notions of anonymity (e.g., unobservability and sender anonymity).We then study the feasibility of ultimate anonymity: the strongest-possible anonymity requirements and adversaries. We show there is a protocol satisfying this requirement, but with absurd (although polynomial) inefficiency and overhead. We show that such inefficiency and overhead are unavoidable for 'ultimate anonymity'. We then present a slightly-relaxed requirement and present feasible protocols for it.

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“…Independently, different cryptographic [7,3] and traffic-analysis models [12,13] have been developed for variants of onion routing. Whereas our work here does not consider traffic analysis explicitly, our in-depth results can be composed with meaningful models of traffic analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity-Preserving Public-Key Encryption: A Constructive Approach

Kohlweiss

Maurer

Onete

et al. 2013

Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Abstract. A receiver-anonymous channel allows a sender to send a message to a receiver without an adversary learning for whom the message is intended. Wireless broadcast channels naturally provide receiver anonymity, as does multi-casting one message to a receiver population containing the intended receiver. While anonymity and confidentiality appear to be orthogonal properties, making anonymous communication confidential is more involved than one might expect, since the ciphertext might reveal which public key has been used to encrypt. To address this problem, public-key cryptosystems with enhanced security properties have been proposed. We investigate constructions as well as limitations for preserving receiver anonymity when using public-key encryption (PKE). We use the constructive cryptography approach by Maurer and Renner and interpret cryptographic schemes as constructions of a certain ideal resource (e.g. a confidential anonymous channel) from given real resources (e.g. a broadcast channel). We define appropriate anonymous communication resources and show that a very natural resource can be constructed by using a PKE scheme which fulfills three properties that appear in cryptographic literature (IND-CCA, key-privacy, weak robustness). We also show that a desirable stronger variant, preventing the adversary from selective "trial-deliveries" of messages, is unfortunately unachievable by any PKE scheme, no matter how strong. The constructive approach makes the guarantees achieved by applying a cryptographic scheme explicit in the constructed (ideal) resource; this specifies the exact requirements for the applicability of a cryptographic scheme in a given context. It also allows to decide which of the existing security properties of such a cryptographic scheme are adequate for the considered scenario, and which are too weak or too strong. Here, we show that weak robustness is necessary but that so-called strong robustness is unnecessarily strong in that it does not construct a (natural) stronger resource.

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A Model of Onion Routing with Provable Anonymity

Cited by 33 publications

References 19 publications

AnoA: A Framework for Analyzing Anonymous Communication Protocols

AnoA: A Framework for Analyzing Anonymous Communication Protocols

On the limits of provable anonymity

Anonymity-Preserving Public-Key Encryption: A Constructive Approach

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