A model of reputation building and destruction

The Design of Health Care Management Program for Chinese Health Care Professionals

“…These seven factors were the school's reputation, the attitude of administrative personnel, the ability and attitude of faculty members, the curriculum design, the responsiveness of administrative personnel and faculty members, the school's physical environment and the access of facilities in the school. Other previous studies (Bitner, 1992;Hampton, 1993;Herbig, Milewicz, & Golden, 1994;Winters, 1991) also support LeBlanc and Nguyen's (1997) findings regarding quality factors in business education. Stefan, Roxana, and Markus (2004) conducted a survey at European universities and found that the following dimensions of quality were considered important by students in business school settings: corporate collaboration, information and responsiveness, courses offered, campus facilities, teaching practices, internal evaluations, external evaluations, computer facilities, collaboration and comparison, post-study factors, and library resources.…”

Reputation and regulation

“…10 The effect of regulation on the behaviour of market participants is similar to the effects of an insurance contract: within a regulated market, participants will behave differently in screening, selecting and monitoring their counterparties. Under an insurance contract, though, the insured pays the insurer for the assumption of a specific risk, and receives, in return, a well-defined claim against the insurer upon the occurrence of the event insured.…”

“…Physicians and lawyers, in turn, know about the importance of their reputation for their business perspectives. Keeping their long-term reputation in mind, they will refrain from opportunistically making short-term use of the incompleteness of their contracts [10,15,26,27]. Reputation therefore is a key element in the governance of some of the most important standard contracts of a modern economy, 4 as the concern for one's own reputation serves as an alternative enforcement mechanism.…”

The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task

“…8 In particular, Strausz (1997) studies whether the principal should retain a costly monitoring task or delegate it to an independent supervisor. Although collusion may arise, delegation is more efficient as the agent's compensation can be 7 For instance, Herbig et al (1994) argue that how the firm is generally seen by its stakeholders has a greater impact on the firm's reputation than the quality of the services it provides. On the lingering effects of corruption on firms' reputation see also Tirole (1996).…”