2015
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12127
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A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Abstract: Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a p… Show more

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