A Model of Waste Price in a Symbiotic Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Algorithm

Abstract

By establishing a two-level symbiotic supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, we use Stackelberg method to analyze the optimal price and revenue model of supplier and manufacturer in the symbiotic supply chain under two power structures in which the supplier and manufacturer are dominant respectively, and analyze the influence of the degree of symbiosis and power structure on the model. Through comparative analysis, we find that: There is a relationship between the income level and the degree of symbiosis in the symbiotic supply chain. The change of power structure will affect the relative benefits of suppliers and manufacturers in the symbiotic supply chain. The manufacturer’s expected unit product revenue will affect the supply chain revenue when the manufacturer is dominant. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example analysis, and the validity of the conclusion is verified. This paper has a guiding significance for the behavior of enterprises in the cogeneration supply chain.

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