2020
DOI: 10.1088/1361-6455/abc7fd
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A modified practical homodyne detector model for continuous-variable quantum key distribution: detailed security analysis and improvement by the phase-sensitive amplifier

Abstract: The practical homodyne detector model of continuous-variable quantum key distribution models the inherent imperfections of the practical homodyne detector, namely the limited detection efficiency and the electronic noise, into trusted loss. However, the conventional practical homodyne detector model is valid only when both the imperfections of the practical homodyne detector are calibrated. In this paper, we show a modified practical homodyne detector model that can model the imperfections separately. The phas… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…where both xv 1 and xv 2 have a variance of 1. In the modified detector model, a new SNU which is not the same as the conventional detector model is defined as [37,[40][41][42], where V ele represents the variance of X ele , so the output normalized by the new SNU is given by…”
Section: Imperfections and Trusted Model Of The Practical Homodyne De...mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…where both xv 1 and xv 2 have a variance of 1. In the modified detector model, a new SNU which is not the same as the conventional detector model is defined as [37,[40][41][42], where V ele represents the variance of X ele , so the output normalized by the new SNU is given by…”
Section: Imperfections and Trusted Model Of The Practical Homodyne De...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In terms of the second part of Equation ( 9), The electronic noise will not be calibrated within the PM model so that the mode D is unknown to us [40]. Equation ( 12) will be rewritten as…”
Section: The Secret Key Rate Of Modified Detector Model Against Fast-...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this section, we show the performance of the downstream access network by applying the security analysis that we proved in Section III. The one-time-calibration model [41,42] is applied in the secret key rate calculation, since it can model the practical imperfections of the homodyne detector and is more applicable in practical implementations, detailed secret key rate calculation is provided in the Appendix.…”
Section: Performance Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The secret key rate is calculated by following the proposed security analysis for the downstream access network in Section III, and the one-time calibration model [41,42] which is designed for modelling the imperfections of practical homodyne detector. Again, the coherent state and homodyne detection scheme is taken as an example in the calculation.…”
Section: Appendix: Secret Key Rate Calculationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the deviation between the theoretical assumption and the actual implementation will effect the performance and may lead to a loophole in the practical system that could be used by Eve to intercept key information without being discovered. The loopholes involve the the laser source [ 23 , 24 , 25 ], the local oscillator [ 26 , 27 ], the beam splitter (BS) [ 28 , 29 , 30 ], the basis choice [ 31 ], and the detector [ 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 ]. Nowadays, researchers have proposed the CV-MDI-QKD protocol [ 38 , 39 , 40 ], which can defend all detector side channels.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%