A multi‐attack resilient lightweight IoT authentication scheme

Abstract

Majority of the devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) are deployed in an environment that is susceptible to cyber-attacks. Due to the resource-constraint nature of IoT, it is very hard to meet the security challenges that arise due to the deployment of IoT devices in the unsecure environment. In this context, the authentication of IoT devices is one of the core challenges. Many protocols have been designed to address and overcome the security issues that stem from the authentication failure. However, many of these protocols are designed using the complex cryptographic techniques that may not be supported by IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a lightweight and secure mutual authentication scheme for resource constraint IoT devices. The proposed scheme is robust against cyber-attacks, such as impersonation, modification, session key disclosure, and eavesdropping attacks. The security of the proposed scheme is formally tested using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications tool and found the scheme to be secure in the Dolev-Yao attack model. Moreover, the performance features such as communication overhead, computation time, and the turnaround time of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with the recent schemes of same category, where the proposed scheme shows a balance of performance without compromising the security features.

A lightweight authentication and key exchange mechanism for IPv6 over low‐power wireless personal area networks‐based Internet of things

“…The overhead of Srinivas et al 21 is 29 T h , Dhillon and Kalra 11 is 22 T h , Qiu and Ma 8 is 25 T h , Turkanovi? et al 12 is 19 T h , Adeel et al 24 is 19 T h , and Dhillon and Kalra 25 is 22 T h whereas our proposed scheme consume total of 18 T h as shown in Table 3.…”

Lightweight Authentication Protocol for M2M Communications of Resource-Constrained Devices in Industrial Internet of Things

“…The security properties of LAKD protocol and the other schemes for M2M communication were analyzed to obtain their attack resistance. Furthermore, articles that have a security analysis of the comparison schemes were reviewed to complete the information, such as [28][29][30]. In Table 8 is summarized the analysis results of common attacks, as was done in [44,45,64,65].…”

“…Take Esfahani et al's protocol, for example. It has been found vulnerable to modification, session and long-term key disclosure, privileged insider, impersonation, DoS, and tracking attacks in [28][29][30]. Concerning Joshitta et al, some of its security vulnerabilities are the use of the same session key between sessions, and its disclosure.…”

“…That only uses the operations xor and hash function; thus, it is very lightweight. However, many vulnerabilities have been found in the protocol [28][29][30].…”

Highly Efficient Symmetric Key Based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol Using Keccak

“…In the area of Industrial IoT applications, we can distinguish the recent work of [6] in which a lightweight authentication and key distribution (LAKD) scheme has been proposed built of only hash functions, xoring, addition, and subtraction. Their work was inspired on the protocol of [7] in which several weaknesses have been identified by [8][9][10], being a lack of protection against tracking, offline identity guessing, impersonation, and replay attacks. Their scheme [6] consists of four communication phases and a lot of hash calls should be made at the sensor node.…”