2000
DOI: 10.1016/s0377-2217(99)00286-6
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A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…For decision-makers and managers, the award of a prize entails reaffirmation before shareholders that the decisions made have been appropriate (agency conflicts avoidance (Vetschera, 2000)); and for the firm itself, it is a way to convey differentiation to the market (information asymmetries reduction (Akerlof, 1970)). …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For decision-makers and managers, the award of a prize entails reaffirmation before shareholders that the decisions made have been appropriate (agency conflicts avoidance (Vetschera, 2000)); and for the firm itself, it is a way to convey differentiation to the market (information asymmetries reduction (Akerlof, 1970)). …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A negotiation support system advising one negotiator could use the information collected so far about the opponent's preferences to predict decisions of the opponent, like the acceptability of an offer that the negotiator considers to make. By a suitable partitioning of the remaining parameter set S, similar to the approach proposed in (Vetschera, 2000), one could calculate probabilities that the opponent prefers one offer over another, or the probability that a certain offer is optimal for the opponent. This information could also be used to optimize the offers of a negotiator so that more can be learned from the opponent's responses (Vetschera, 2004).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%