A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

Fazekas, Péter; Overgaard, Morten

doi:10.1111/cogs.12478

Cited by 46 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 83 publications

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“…The Partial Awareness Hypothesis [23] argues that mental representations can be 'partial', and this explains what falsely can appear as a distinction between access and experience. Fazekas & Overgaard [43] suggest that consciousness (access as well as experience) can be degraded in different ways and suggest different mechanisms underlying this. These different theoretical proposals share, among other things, the idea that access and experience fundamentally go together as a principal thing.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

Overgaard

2018

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible-yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate-under the condition that 'cognitive access' is defined as working memory or attention. However, if 'access' is defined as information becoming 'cognitively available', in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

Overgaard

2018

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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“…The term "global workspace" (Baars, 1988) or "global neuronal workspace" (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) refers to a kind of central information exchange in the brain, subject to the limited capacity of working memory, but serving as a hub for the flow of information to or between specialized processors. The perceived present serves a similar function: There is no point in holding information if it is not to be potentially available to subsequent processing (Cleeremans, 2011;Farah, 1984;Fazekas & Overgaard, 2018). The kind of processing to which information in the perceived present might be available is a matter of conjecture.…”

Section: Perceptual Processes and Productsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The perceived present: What is it, and what is it there for?

White

2020

Psychon Bull Rev

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It is proposed that the perceived present is not a moment in time, but an information structure comprising an integrated set of products of perceptual processing. All information in the perceived present carries an informational time marker identifying it as "present". This marker is exclusive to information in the perceived present. There are other kinds of time markers, such as ordinality ("this stimulus occurred before that one") and duration ("this stimulus lasted for 50 ms"). These are different from the "present" time marker and may be attached to information regardless of whether it is in the perceived present or not. It is proposed that the perceived present is a very short-term and very high-capacity holding area for perceptual information. The maximum holding time for any given piece of information is~100 ms: This is affected by the need to balance the value of informational persistence for further processing against the problem of obsolescence of the information. The main function of the perceived present is to facilitate access by other specialized, automatic processes.

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“…in the form of various types of AMs-is being integrated into SAS. Recently, Fazekas & Overgaard [80] have published an extensive analysis of both cognitive and neural aspects of subjective experiences and perceptual representations. It is being demonstrated that both conscious experience and information at the representational level can be degraded along multiple dimensions.…”

Section: Implications For Consciousness and Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As described in the REFCON and REFGEN models, the level of AM integration is a crucial factor regarding the level of phenomenal consciousness. As phenomenal consciousness is interpreted as tied to availability, the situational and strategy-related interactions between SAS and GAS may not only influence the level of experienced consciousness but also qualitative factors such as those addressed by Fazekas & Overgaard [80]. In this way, according to the REF framework, phenomenal consciousness cannot 'overflow' availability of information for action [4,5].…”

Section: Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness In The Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reorganization of the connectivity between elementary functions as a common mechanism of phenomenal consciousness and working memory: from functions to strategies

Mogensen

Overgaard

2018

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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In the present communication, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and the closely related concept of working memory are presented in the context of a neurocognitive model-the REF (reorganization of elementary functions) framework. The REF framework is based on connectionist networks within which the 'units' are advanced processing modules called elementary functions (EFs). In this framework, the focus is on dynamically changeable 'strategies'-based on reorganizations of the connectivity between EFs-rather than on the more traditional 'cognitive functions'. The background for the REF framework and especially how the neural correlate of consciousness is understood within these models is summarized. According to the REF framework, phenomenal consciousness cannot 'overflow' availability of information for action. Phenomenal consciousness may, however, overflow working memory because working memory in the present context is seen as a surface phenomenon reflecting underlying dynamic strategies-influenced by both experience and situational factors.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

Cited by 46 publications

References 83 publications

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

The perceived present: What is it, and what is it there for?

Reorganization of the connectivity between elementary functions as a common mechanism of phenomenal consciousness and working memory: from functions to strategies

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