A Multiagent Game Theoretic Simulation of Public Policy Coordination through Collaboration

Herrera-Medina, Eleonora; Font, Antoni Riera

doi:10.3390/su151511887

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the agricultural sector, due to pronounced information asymmetry within the agricultural supply chain and the challenges associated with monitoring the quality of agricultural products, certain stakeholders are motivated by personal interests, potentially leading to harm to the interests of others and resulting in conflicts of interest within the supply chain [8]. In the context of this three-party game, complex interactions arise among the agricultural product information sharing platform, information providers, and consumers.…”

Section: Open Access Edited Bymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders’ decision-making behavior in agricultural data supply chain

Zhao,

Yang

2024

Front. Phys.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The significance of agricultural information sharing in fostering agricultural development cannot be overstated. This practice plays a pivotal role in disseminating cutting-edge agricultural technologies, cultivation methods, and pest control strategies, empowering farmers with valuable knowledge to enhance crop yield and quality. Moreover, it aligns with government objectives of resource sharing and addressing gaps, contributing to the advancement of agricultural modernization and the development of the industry chain. Despite its inherent benefits, the practical implementation of agricultural information sharing faces challenges. Stakeholders engaged in information sharing often prioritize individual benefits, potentially leading to a decline in agricultural information quality and the inefficient use of experimental resources. To confront this issue, the present research establishes a three-party evolutionary game model comprising an agricultural product data sharing platform, agricultural data providers, and agricultural data consumers. Leveraging dynamic system theory, the model analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies of stakeholders and investigates the critical factors influencing the strategic choices of these three parties. Experimental findings underscore the pivotal role of participants’ initial strategies, regulatory intensity, reward and punishment mechanisms, and information feedback in shaping stakeholder decision-making behavior. Implementation of measures such as heightened scrutiny of information on the sharing platform and fostering consumer trust in data emerges as imperative for enhancing system stability. These actions are essential for constructing an efficient and reliable information-sharing ecosystem, thereby facilitating the sustainable development of modern agriculture.

show abstract

Section: Open Access Edited Bymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders’ decision-making behavior in agricultural data supply chain

Zhao,

Yang

2024

Front. Phys.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

A Game Theoretic Approach to Collaboration in Policy Coordination

Herrera-Medina,

Riera Font

2023

Economies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Public policies are courses of action by a government in response to public problems in the real world with the aim of meeting the needs of society. Such policies must be coordinated to avoid inefficiencies. Most attempts to model public policy coordination are qualitative and, therefore, do not yield precise conclusions. More accurate modelling attempts are found in game theory, but they are not entirely appropriate as models of policy coordination, because policy coordination involves a high degree of collaboration. There is only one game-theoretic model of collaboration, and it does not model public policy coordination. The aim of this article is to show that a collaboration-based game theory model is not only feasible, but also more realistic than current game theory models of policy coordination. This was performed by adapting Newton’s seminal model to a society capable of formulating and coordinating policies. When this adapted game was compared to alternative games used to explain policy coordination, it was found that the adapted game made more realistic assumptions, the modelling process was simpler, and it can be applied to a broader range of contexts. By demonstrating that the adapted model offers a feasible theoretical foundation for the modelling of policy coordination, this paper provides a starting point for future modelling efforts in this area.

show abstract

A Bargaining with Negotiation Cost for Water Use and Pollution Conflict Management

Fan,

Fu,

Zhao

2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The intensifying overexploitation of water resources and the increasing pollution discharge have exacerbated conflicts in water resource utilization, making it urgent to effectively reconcile the contradiction between water resource utilization and environmental protection. This study developed a Cost-Inclusive Multi-Objective Bargaining Methodology (CIMB), coupled with a Compromise Programming (CP) method, to address conflicts between water use and pollution discharge, considering the economic benefits and the sustainable development of water resources. A deterministic multi-objective bargaining approach was employed, with two players representing the maximization of water use benefits and the minimization of total pollution discharge. This study takes the middle and lower reaches of the Han River region as an example to optimize water resource allocation in ten cities in this area. Using the CIMB-CP model, the water use and pollution discharge for different cities were obtained, and the impact of various factors on the game outcomes was analyzed. The model results indicate that negotiation cost have a significant impact on the Nash equilibrium solution. Compared to the Cost-Exclusive Multi-Objective Bargaining Methodology (CEMB) model, the Nash equilibrium solution of the CIMB-CP model shows an approximately 0.1% decrease in economic benefits and an approximately 0.3% decrease in pollution discharge. The risk attitudes of the participants have a significant impact on the game outcomes, and decision-makers need to formulate corresponding negotiation strategies based on their own risk preferences.

show abstract

A Multiagent Game Theoretic Simulation of Public Policy Coordination through Collaboration

Cited by 3 publications

References 47 publications

Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders’ decision-making behavior in agricultural data supply chain

Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders’ decision-making behavior in agricultural data supply chain

A Game Theoretic Approach to Collaboration in Policy Coordination

A Bargaining with Negotiation Cost for Water Use and Pollution Conflict Management

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About