A network survivability model for critical national infrastructures

Self Cite

Next-generation networks (NGNs g., alternating current (AC) power and non-central office deployment), is considered in the design for network reliability. The paper includes examples from implementation of the methodology to IP Multimedia Systems (IMS) networks. © 2008 Alcatel-Lucent.of performance [9] and reliability [10] and systems which could measure them [15]. Then, even within the new packet networks, additional evolution was necessary, for example, to design multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) IP networks. In every case, there were questions about how reliable the networks could be, given that they embodied new hardware and software which did not enjoy the longer operational, development, and deployment experiences of their predecessor "legacy" technology networks. In the early stages of new hardware development, there is always a high degree of "infant mortality" [17]. Similarly, questions regarding reliability exist today for the nextgeneration networks [1,11].

Section: Non-traditional Sources Of Failure-powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Reliability of next-generation networks with a focus on IMS architecture

Pant¹,

Chu²,

Richman³

et al. 2008

Self Cite

“…Bell Labs has developed specialized, state-of-theart simulation models for analysis of networks to study the effects of disruptions, traffic overloads, and user behavior on network performance [6]. The primary suite of simulation models is called N-SMART (network simulation modeling and analysis research tools) and these tools cover both discrete event and/or flow-based models of telecommunications traffic across networks: 1.…”

Section: Models Of Telecommentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Each of the infrastructures is highly dependent on telecommunications [6] and each of the infrastructures is subject to …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Critical national infrastructure reliability modeling and analysis

Conrad

Leclaire

O'Reilly³

et al. 2006

Self Cite

“…Bell Labs has developed a discrete event simulation model-the Network Simulation Model Analysis Research Tool (N-SMART) [4], which simulates a complete metropolitan area on a call-by-call basis. Figure 3 shows the components of the model that takes a description of a metropolitan area in terms of residence and business demands and traffic loads and then simulates the network on a call-by-call basis, taking into account customer re-attempts when calls do not complete (are blocked).…”

Section: The N-smart Simulation Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter-infrastructure modeling-ports and telecommunications

Beyeler¹,

Conrad²,

Corbet³

et al. 2004

Self Cite

BackgroundDisruptions to our critical national infrastructures (e.g., power, telecommmunications, shipping) are areas of increasing national concern. For example, since the events of September 11, 2001, container shipments through U.S. ports are believed to be a potential pathway for the introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the United States, thereby threatening homeland security. New security measures have been implemented, and others have been proposed, in an effort to reduce this perceived threat.These measures call for additional processes and equipment in container shipment to better characterize and control cargo. Much of this requires increased reliable communications. Requiring new security measures can change important performance characteristics of the port such as the time and cost required to import and export goods. These performance changes can suppress overall demand for shipping and change the relative attractiveness of ports to importers, exporters, and cargo carriers. Successful port operations require the coordinated action through communications of many disparate people and organizations, including ship owners, port authorities, importers and exporters, labor unions, and government agencies. Port operations depend on reliable performance of various infrastructures, including electric power systems, telecommunications systems, and petroleum refining and distribution systems. Understanding the potential for disruptions caused by infrastructure interactions is one goal of the effort to make infrastructures more secure [6]. We are therefore interested in the sensitivity of port performance to infrastructure disruptions; specifically, we focus on this question: What are the conditions that cause infrastructure disruptions and how will those disruptions impact port operations?There are two primary time scales of interest in this problem [1]. First, the mechanics of port operations and its performance in response to disruptions operates on a time scale extending over days and weeks to months. Second, long-term competitiveness and economic viability of a port-especially in shouldering the burden of paying for increased security measures-play out over a time scale that extends over years to more than a decade. Here we hypothesize that, similar to many system dynamics problems [2,5], cause and effect may not be closely related in time. In this paper, we focus on the short-term impacts of telecommunications disruptions.