A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions

DeMartini, Christine; Kwasnica, Anthony M.; Ledyard, John O.; Porter, David

doi:10.1017/9781316471609.020

Cited by 45 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Several recent proposed combinatorial auction procedures, such as the RAD procedure studied in Kwasnica et al (2003), produce approximate shadow prices on individual items to help guide bidders. The clock auction just does this directly.…”

Section: Improving Price Discoverymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²,

Milgrom³

2005

Combinatorial Auctions

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We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.

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Section: Improving Price Discoverymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²,

Milgrom³

2005

Combinatorial Auctions

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“…maximizing the minimum price, or minimizing the sum of squared deviations from previous round prices (Kwasnica et al, 2005).…”

Section: Auction Formatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For purposes of comparison, we also consider the SMR format currently used by the FCC, and a fully flexible auction format that does not restrict package bids that can be submitted. This fully flexible format is a version of the FCC's Modified Package Bidding (MPB) that uses the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) pricing mechanism proposed by Kwasnica et al (2005). 3 RAD prices are essentially approximations to shadow prices determined by the dual of a constrained revenue-maximization problem, as explained in more detail below.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction

Goeree

Holt

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Peke c, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these 'wind tunnel' tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in the major upcoming 700MHz auction. AbstractWe introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Pekeč, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these "wind tunnel" tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in the major upcoming 700MHz auction.JEL codes: D44, C92

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“…Direct elicitation approaches, in which bidders respond to explicit queries about their valuations, have also been proposed for one-sided CAs (Conen & Sandholm, 2001;Hudson & Sandholm, 2004;Lahaie & Parkes, 2004;Lahaie, Constantin, & Parkes, 2005). Of particular relevance here are the ascending CAs that are designed to work with simple prices on items (Dunford, Hoffman, Menon, Sultana, & Wilson, 2003;Kwasnica, Ledyard, Porter, & DeMartini, 2005). In computing (approximately competitive) linear prices, we generalize and extend these methods.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange

Lubin¹,

Juda²,

Cavallo³

et al. 2008

jair

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We present the design and analysis of the first fully expressive, iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language (TBBL) that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders specify lower and upper bounds in TBBL on their value for different trades and refine these bounds across rounds. These bounds allow price discovery and useful preference elicitation in early rounds, and allow termination with an efficient trade despite partial information on bidder valuations. All computation in the exchange is carefully optimized to exploit the structure of the bid-trees and to avoid enumerating trades. A proxied interpretation of a revealed-preference activity rule, coupled with simple linear prices, ensures progress across rounds. The exchange is fully implemented, and we give results demonstrating several aspects of its scalability and economic properties with simulated bidding strategies.

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A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions

Cited by 45 publications

References 5 publications

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction

ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange

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