A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations

Coercion, contract and the limits of the market

“…But given that property rights must here mean an assignment of rights over all possible actions, there is the possibility of ambiguity that is discussed below. 13 See Akerlof, 1976;Deshpande, 1999;Basu, 2000;Naqvi and Wemhoner, 1995;Hatlebakk, 2002;Villanger, 2004Villanger, , 2005 make an offer so that, by accepting it, the worker gets the same level of utility as (or maybe an epsilon more than) what he would get if he got nothing from the landlord and nothing from the merchant. And so the worker will accept this offer since it is as good as (or 0 better than) what his alternative is.…”

Company Influence on Foreign Aid Disbursement: Is Conditionality Credible When Donors Have Mixed Motives?

“…So assume that, ceteris paribus, ) , , ( However, as shown in the proof, it is not necessary to restrict the recipient's utility function for our equilibrium to exist Let us contrast the proof with Hatlebakk (2002). There are two important differences.…”

“…Second, we specify the condition that the first mover must not be better off by offering an ordinary contract once the equilibrium path is started, see (17). A parallel to this condition is also necessary for the solution in Hatlebakk (2002), but not stated explicitly. As we have shown in section 4.4, it is not sufficient to assume that the player that offers the favorable contract does not offer so favorable terms that this player looses the whole surplus from making the threat credible (i.e.…”

Credit layering in informal financial markets

“…4 See Section 2 of the paper. 5 See also Hatlebakk (2002) for an extension of this model. 6 See for example, Bell (1993), Bose (1998), Floro and Ray (1997), Fuentes (1996), Gine (2005), Hoff and Stiglitz (1997), Jain (1999) and Jain and Mansuri (2003).…”