A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente

Hansen, Nat

doi:10.1111/nous.12103

Nous

2015

DOI: 10.1111/nous.12103

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A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente

Nat Hansen

Abstract: I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez‐Torrente 2016).

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“…Nat Hansen () argues that, even if this objectivist response can accommodate known disagreements about statements predicating positive color adjectives, it cannot do the same for all conceivable disagreements involving comparative color statements. One might think that the truth conditions for x is greener than y under an account like mine can be described as follows (again abstracting from several complications): x is greener than y is true in a context just in case x has a hue value closer to the contextual unique green hue value than y .…”

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Objectivism about Color and Comparative Color Statements. Reply to Hansen*

Gómez‐Torrente

2015

Nous

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Nat Hansen builds a new argument for subjectivism about the semantics of color language, based on a potential kind of intersubjective disagreements about comparative color statements. In reply, I note that the disagreements of this kind are merely hypothetical, probably few if actual, and not evidently relevant as test cases for a semantic theory. Furthermore, even if they turned out to be actual and semantically relevant, they would be intuitively unusable by the subjectivist.

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Objectivism about Color and Comparative Color Statements. Reply to Hansen*

Gómez‐Torrente

2015

Nous

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Objectivity and Perspectival Content

Kölbel

2019

Erkenn

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What is objectivity? What would it take to have objective representations and do we (humans) have what it takes? This paper aims to contribute to answering these questions. To this end, it isolates one relevant sense of objectivity and proposes a generalization of standard frameworks of representational content in order to engage with the question in a way that is rhetorically fair. Armed with a general conception of perspectival content, taken from the literature on centred or de se content, the paper articulates one necessary condition for objective representation: the possession of objective concepts and therefore objective contents. Two ways of meeting (or approximately meeting) this condition are discussed in an exploratory way.

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Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation

Hansen

2016

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gómez-Torrente (2016) Noûs 50(1): 3–40),. In (Hansen (2015)), I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn’t apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.

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A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente

Abstract: I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez‐Torrente 2016).

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

Objectivism about Color and Comparative Color Statements. Reply to Hansen*

Objectivism about Color and Comparative Color Statements. Reply to Hansen*

Objectivity and Perspectival Content

Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation

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