A New Availability-Payment" Model for Pricing Performance-Based Logistics Contracts"

Kashani-Pour, Amir; Zhu, Xinyan; Sandborn, Peter; Cui, Qingbin

doi:10.21236/ada612031

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…e recent studies on PPP project performance mainly include the influencing factors of PPP project performance [12][13][14][15], construction and evaluation methods of performance goals, key performance indicator systems [16][17][18], availability payment [19][20][21], safe payment [22][23][24], combined payment mechanism [3,4,25], and other specific performance payment mechanisms designs. ese studies research the performance planning link in the performance management of PPP projects and provide a robust theoretical basis for the subsequent study on the vital link of the PPP project performance payment: performance appraisal.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although there are many rent-seeking behaviours in PPP performance appraisal [6,11], the recent studies on PPP project performance management mainly focused on the influencing factors of PPP project performance [12][13][14][15], construction and evaluation methods of performance goals, crucial performance indicator systems [16][17][18], availability payment [19][20][21], safe payment [22][23][24], combined payment mechanism [3,4,25], and other specific performance payment mechanism designs. Rare attention was paid to the behaviours between the private investor and the third party in performance appraisal, a key part of performance management.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

Tan

et al. 2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Performance appraisal is a key link in the performance payment mechanism of government-paid Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. As the performance appraisal of PPP projects is highly professional and complex, it is usually necessary to introduce a third-party performance appraisal institution to evaluate the project outputs of the private investor. However, driven by economic rent, the private investor has the incentive to seek rent from the third party in the performance appraisal process, leading to the low overall performance level of PPP projects and the inability to achieve the PPP performance appraisal goal effectively. To explore how to avoid rent-seeking in performance appraisal and improve the overall performance of government-paid PPP projects, a tripartite evolutionary game model between the behaviour, third party, and the public sector has been constructed. Based on the evolutionary game model, this study analyses the evolutionary stability of each player's strategy, discusses the influence of various factors on the strategy selection of the three-party, and further analyses the stability of the equilibrium point of the three-party game system. The findings reveal that the public sector can slow down the rent-seeking behaviour of the private sector by setting up a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism. The design of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism must meet the following conditions: (1) the sum of the reward and punishment of all parties is greater than the speculative income; (2) the amount of performance fee withheld for the private investor is greater than the difference between the project operating cost saved and the speculation cost. The research provides technical support for the design of the performance appraisal mechanism of government-paid PPP projects.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

Tan

et al. 2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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The Effect of Yaw Error on the Reliability of Wind Turbine Blades

Bakhshi

Sandborn

2016

Volume 1: Biofuels, Hydrogen, Syngas, and Alternate Fuels; CHP and Hybrid Power and Energy Systems; Concentrating Solar Power;

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The rise of energy prices, concerns over climate change and geopolitical issues have brought special attention to renewable sources of energy and wind energy in particular. Based on NREL projections, the United States has more than 32,000 TWh of onshore and 17,000 TWh of offshore potential for wind power generation, which is far beyond its 11,000 TWh of current annual electricity consumption. However, there are a number of efficiency challenges that must be overcome in order to turn this potential into actual production. One area that can potentially improve the energy production of wind turbines is the correction of yaw error. Yaw error (also referred to as yaw angle or yaw misalignment) is the angle between the turbine’s rotor and the wind direction. A yaw error reduces turbine’s power production at wind speeds below the rated speed. Besides impacting the power producing ability of a turbine, yaw error also affects the reliability of critical subsystems in wind turbines. Variation in yaw error (at any wind speed and not only below the rated speed) affects the loads on the components and the subsequent mechanical stresses. These mechanical stresses change the damage accumulation for components and sub-assemblies, which ultimately affects their reliability. About 17 to 28% of wind project costs attribute to O&M costs, which are directly affected by the reliability. In this study, we investigate the effects of yaw error on the reliability of blades by performing load and stress analysis for various yaw errors. We then use the results of these analyses to adjust the Weibull parameters used for predicting the failure time of blades. Finally, we will use a stochastic cost model to show how correcting the yaw error can avoid maintenance costs in wind farms.

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Obsolescence Management for Sustainment-Dominated Military Systems

Özkan

Bulkan

2019

Operations Research for Military Organizations

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As more and more Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) parts are being used in sustainment-dominated systems where average product lifecycle is above 25 years, obsolescence management becomes a greater concern for program managers. The lack of management and poor planning for obsolescence cause companies, governments, and military organizations to spend progressively more to deal with aging systems. For a successful obsolescence management, program managers should consider both the cost-effectiveness and system availability issues simultaneously and should implement appropriate solution approaches. In this chapter, the authors first define the obsolescence management in sustainment-dominated systems and then give a brief summary of the related literature. They finally discuss and propose multiple criteria decision-making methodologies and evolutionary algorithms to tackle the management problem.

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A New Availability-Payment" Model for Pricing Performance-Based Logistics Contracts"

Cited by 4 publications

References 9 publications

How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

The Effect of Yaw Error on the Reliability of Wind Turbine Blades

Obsolescence Management for Sustainment-Dominated Military Systems

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