A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory

Abstract

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet.

A Model for Basic Emotions Using Observations of Behavior in Drosophila

“…Basic emotion theory has been very influential for more than half a century, providing inspiration for interventions in psychopathology (Saarimaki et al, 2016; Celeghin et al, 2017; Williams, 2017; Hutto et al, 2018; Song and Hakoda, 2018; Vetter et al, 2018; Wang et al, 2018). Theories about basic emotions originated from ancient Greece and China (Russell, 2003).…”

“…Theories about basic emotions originated from ancient Greece and China (Russell, 2003). Current basic emotion theory started with Darwin (1872) and Ekman (2003), and later (Tomkins, 1962), subsequently followed by Ekman (1984), and Izard (1977), then by many current psychologists (Ortony and Turner, 1990; Panksepp, 2007; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011; Gu et al, 2016, 2018; Saarimaki et al, 2016; Hutto et al, 2018). Basic emotion theory proposes that human beings have a limited number of emotions (e.g., fear, anger, joy, sadness) that are biologically and psychologically “basic” (Wilson-Mendenhall et al, 2013), each manifested in an organized recurring pattern of associated behavioral components (Ekman, 1992a; Russell, 2006).…”

An Integrative Way for Studying Neural Basis of Basic Emotions With fMRI

“…During the past decades, basic emotion theory has been very influential in the field of affective studies (Saarimaki et al, 2016; Celeghin et al, 2017; Williams, 2017; Hutto et al, 2018; Song and Hakoda, 2018; Vetter et al, 2018; Wang et al, 2018), which proposed that all human emotions are composed of limited number of basic emotions (e.g., fear, anger, joy, sadness), which are considered to be more elementary than others. These emotions are called basic emotions, for they are biologically and psychologically “basic”.…”

“…Therefore, studying the neural basis might be the best way to differentiate the basic emotions and probe into the number of basic emotions. However, many fMRI studies have met some troubles in differentiating the basic emotions (such as fear, anger, joy, sad, and disgust) with distinct universal signals, physiology, especially the localization of the central nervous system (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al, 2012), which has led to even more controversies about the basic emotions (Posner et al, 2005; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011; Scarantino, 2015; Hutto et al, 2018). For example, even though neuroimaging studies found some evidence for basic emotions [such as amygdala for fear (Ohman, 2005), insula for disgust (Wicker et al, 2003), anterior cingulate cortex for sadness, orbitofrontal cortex for anger (Murphy et al, 2003)], these neuroimaging data are not consistent with specific one-to-one correspondence between fMRI localization of anger, sadness, fear, disgust, etc (Lindquist et al, 2012; Clark-Polner et al, 2017).…”

In the face of stress: Interpreting individual differences in stress-induced facial expressions

“…This dearth of knowledge has been recognized and addressed in the domain of affective neuroscience over the last several years. In the course of the development of this discipline, prior conceptualizations of affect have been brought to the forefront and criticized (Barrett, 2006), refined (Hutto et al, 2018), or replaced all together (Barrett, 2017). Our renewed interest in emotional functioning in the context of the brain has reignited age-old debates over how, or even if, affect can be studied in humans in a meaningful and reproducible way (Ekman, 2016).…”