Causality in the Sciences 2011
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0030
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A new causal power theory

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
22
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 14 publications
(22 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
22
0
Order By: Relevance
“…However, transfer entropy still relies on observational data, while a causal approach generally requires perturbational data [ 53 ] (although observational data is sufficient for causal inference in ER systems since they cycle through all their possible states). In this way, our approach is more closely related to proposed measures of causal information flow [ 44 , 54 ], but evaluated in a state-dependent manner, as the information specified by the subset in its current state about its causes and effects (see also [ 55 ]).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, transfer entropy still relies on observational data, while a causal approach generally requires perturbational data [ 53 ] (although observational data is sufficient for causal inference in ER systems since they cycle through all their possible states). In this way, our approach is more closely related to proposed measures of causal information flow [ 44 , 54 ], but evaluated in a state-dependent manner, as the information specified by the subset in its current state about its causes and effects (see also [ 55 ]).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Occurrences that lower the probability of a subsequent occurrence have been termed “preventative causes” by some [ 33 ]. Rather than counting a negative effect information as indicating a possible “preventative effect”, we take the stance that such an occurrence has no effect on , since it actually predicts other occurrences that did not happen.…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this context, the main difference between our proposed framework and existing “contingency”-based definitions is that we simultaneously consider all counterfactual states of the transition, rather than a single contingency (e.g., as in [ 8 , 11 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 30 , 31 ]). This allows us to express the causal analysis in probabilistic, informational terms [ 25 , 32 , 33 , 34 ], which has the additional benefit that our framework naturally extends from deterministic to probabilistic causal networks, and also from binary to multi-valued variables. Finally, it allows us to quantify the strength of all causal links between occurrences and their causes and effects within the transition.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I call this the Proportionality Principle. 8 It is not difficult to prove that Multiplicativity 7 Incidentally, this condition assumes transitivity of causation, which is warranted for C = ¬C (Korb et al, 2011;Halpern, 2016…”
Section: Argument 2: the Multiplicativity Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Principled proposals for explicating causal strength are rare and spread over different disciplines, each with their own motivation and intended context of application. This includes cognitive psychology (Cheng, 1997;Icard et al, 2017), computer science and machine learning (Pearl, 2000;Korb et al, 2009Korb et al, , 2011, statistics (Good, 1961a,b;Holland, 1986;Cohen, 1988), epidemiology and clinical medicine (Poole, 2010;Broadbent, 2013), philosophy of science (Suppes, 1970;Eells, 1991), political philosophy and social choice theory (Braham and van Hees, 2009), and legal theory (Rizzo and Arnold, 1980;Hart and Honoré, 1985;Kaiserman, 2017). Although these approaches use a common formalism-probability theory-, the proposed explications differ substantially (see the survey of Fitelson and Hitchcock, 2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%