A New Conception of Original Sin?

In this paper, I raise the question of how the tradition of ethics after Wittgenstein tends to neglect the historicity of morality, in a way which is not representative of the complexity of Wittgenstein's own thinking. I analyse a tendency towards one-sidedness in the preferred diet of philosophical examples, where focus lies on recognition of, and ethical attentiveness to, a fellow person or creature. Although these examples play an important role in their own right, the overuse of such examples, along with a certain notion of "philosophical grammar", detracts from a historically sensitive investigation of our ethical forms of life. A main cause of philosophical diseasea one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example. 1 1. Wittgenstein (1998).

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A New Conception of Original Sin?

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Iris Murdoch between buddhism and christianity: moral change, conceptual loss/recovery, unselfing

Iris Murdoch between buddhism and christianity: moral change, conceptual loss/recovery, unselfing

A Case for Moral History – Universality and Change in Ethics after Wittgenstein

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