A new epistemological case for theism

Abstract

Relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires one to hold the intuition that the world is ‘intelligible’, that is, such that states of affairs at least generally have explanations for their obtaining. I argue that metaphysical naturalists are rationally required to withhold this intuition, unless they cease to be naturalists. This is because all plausible naturalistic aetiologies of the intuition entail that the intuition and the state of affairs which it represents are not causally connected in an epistemically appropriate way. Given that one ought to rely on IBE, naturalists are forced to pick the latter and change their world-view. Traditional theists, in contrast, do not face this predicament. This, I argue, is strong grounds for preferring traditional theism to naturalism.

Two challenges for ‘no-norms’ theism

“…2.For example, Koons (2000), Graeber and Golemon (2020, 2022), and de Ray (2022). Plantinga's (1993; 2011) EAAN might also be included, as it is intended to show that naturalism (which Plantinga defines roughly as the negation of theism) ought to be abandoned; however, an anonymous referee has fairly pointed out that this does not necessarily qualify the EAAN as an argument for theism.…”