A New Look at Habits Using Simulation Theory

Abstract

Habits as a form of behavior re-execution without explicit deliberation is discussed in terms of implicit anticipation, to be contrasted with explicit anticipation and mental simulation. Two hypotheses, addressing how habits and mental simulation may be implemented in the brain and to what degree they represent two modes brain function, are formulated. Arguments for and against the two hypotheses are discussed shortly, specifically addressing whether habits and mental simulation represent two distinct functions, or to what degree there may be intermediate forms of habit execution involving partial deliberation. A potential role of habits in memory consolidation is also hypnotized.With the endeavor to explain how humans achieve an "inner world" underlying many cognitive abilities, Barsalou [1], Hesslow [2], and Grush [3] have proposed similar theories suggesting that the inner world stem from reactivation of cortical regions producing mental simulations of the agent's interactions with the environment. These so-called simulation theories take an embodied stance to cognitive science, criticizing symbolic and other dis-embodied forms of representations, while emphasizing human's ability to internalize the outer world.