A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms

The effect of board composition and managerial pay on Saudi firm performance

“…They express surprise at finding the lack of a strong relationship between the change in executive wealth and firm value. Olaniyi and Olayeni (2020) explore the causal relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in Nigeria and find a bi-directional relationship. They find that CEO pay causes firm performance and that firm performance negatively causes CEO pay.…”

Asymmetric Effects of Remittances on Economic Growth in Nigeria: Evidence From Non-linear ARDL Analysis

“…Similarly, the Jarque-Bera statistics reveal that most of the series, except and , are normally distributed. This might have justified the importance of using nonlinear and asymmetric method of analysis (Olaniyi & Olayeni, 2020;Shahbaz et al, 2017) of remittance-growth nexus in Nigeria. The features of the variables suggest symmetric approach may give suboptimal results.…”

Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy

“…This is an indication that weak or strong institutions have crucial roles to play in determining the effectiveness of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms (Marcos & Castrillo, 2020; Schmid et al, 2018; Waqar, 2020; Wijayana & Gray, 2019) in listed firms. Some empirical studies have also argued that institutional framework and environment in a country tend to influence the executive compensation contracts (Olaniyi, 2019; Olaniyi, Obembe, et al, 2017; Staw & Epstein, 2000; Usman et al, 2018, 2021) and there is a high tendency for it to be easily hijacked by powerful and influential CEOs/executives to engage in opportunistic behavior to receive unearned pay when institutional settings and corporate governance practices are weak/poor (Olaniyi & Olayeni, 2020; Perryman et al, 2016; Warren et al, 2011). Thus, benchmarking pay for performance for CEOs of listed firms has a high likelihood to be mediated by the level of institutions.…”

“…CEO pay has continued to generate a great deal of research, debate, and discussion as a corporate governance tool in finance literature (Agyemang‐Mintah & Schadewitz, 2019; Al‐Najjar, 2017; Amewu & Alagidede, 2021; Amewu & Alagidede, 2021; Ataay, 2018; Chaigneau & Sahuguet, 2018; Lin & Shi, 2020; Mans‐Kemp & Viviers, 2018; Nourayi, 2006; Olaniyi, 2019; Olaniyi & Olayeni, 2020; Rahman & Mustafa, 2018; Saravanan et al, 2016; Wang & Deng, 2021; Wu, 2021). Agency‐theoretical proposition suggests that CEO pay should be closely tied to firm performance as an effective mechanism of corporate governance to match the managers and shareholders' interests (Al‐Shammari, 2021; Choi et al, 2019; Dang et al, 2021; Ghrab et al, 2021; Gloor, 2021; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Waleed et al, 2021).…”

“…Influential executives often meddle in board politics and affairs to have to say in the determination of their pays (Agrawal & Nasser, 2019; Antounian et al, 2021; Bachmann et al, 2020; Chen et al, 2019; Cho et al, 2019; Choi et al, 2019; Fung & Pecha, 2019; Loyola & Portilla, 2020; Pucheta‐Martínez & Chiva‐Ortells, 2020; Song & Wan, 2019). It implies that compensation contracts for executives usually signal the existence of opportunistic behavior and managerial rent‐seeking activities which subvert the effectiveness of board decisions in designing optimal executive compensation (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Cho et al, 2019; Conyon et al, 2019; Hoi et al, 2019; Göx & Hemmer, 2020; Olaniyi, 2019; Olaniyi & Olayeni, 2020). It also suggests a high likelihood for executive compensation to worsen the situation of asymmetric information and increase the likelihood of its exploitation in listed firms instead of mitigating it.…”