A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

Jooshaki, Mohammad; Abbaspour, Ali; Fotuhi‐Firuzabad, Mahmud; Moeini‐Aghtaie, Moein; Özdemir, Aydoğan

doi:10.1109/isgteurope.2014.7028951

Cited by 11 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The third condition guarantees practicality of the proposed algorithm and decreases computational burden of the studies. To apply this condition, it has been shown that correlation indices can be used to properly determine the degree of similarity of various features . The fourth condition is required because the ultimate objective of this stage is to compare the reliability indices of similar companies.…”

Section: Similar Companies Clusteringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing a new procedure for reward and penalty scheme in performance-based regulation of electricity distribution companies

Jooshaki

Abbaspour

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

et al. 2018

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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Summary This paper introduces a new fuzzy‐based design procedure for more efficient application of reward‐penalty schemes in distribution sector. To achieve a fair as well as applicable regulation scheme, the fuzzy C‐means clustering algorithm is employed to efficiently determine the similarity among distribution companies. As setting procedure of the reward‐penalty scheme parameters can significantly affect the income of different companies, a new procedure based on the membership degrees obtained from the fuzzy C‐means algorithm is proposed to fairly determine these parameters for each electricity distribution company. Some numerical studies are performed on the Iranian electricity distribution companies.

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Section: Similar Companies Clusteringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing a new procedure for reward and penalty scheme in performance-based regulation of electricity distribution companies

Jooshaki

Abbaspour

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

et al. 2018

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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“…Nevertheless, this approach does not necessarily guarantee an equal reliability level for similar customers, which are located in different areas but are subject to identical external conditions 16‐18 . Traditional reliability incentive regulations identically treat different customers located in different geographic areas and even in the territory of diverse DISCOs 19,20 . Although different unreliability costs for similar customers, for example, commercial, industrial, and residential, in different locations, might be justified based on their unequal opportunities, four problems are seen.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reliability incentive regulation based on reward‐penalty mechanism using distribution feeders clustering

Khonakdar-Tarsi

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

Ehsan

et al. 2021

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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Summary This paper proposes an approach to enhance the reliability regulation based on the relative performance. In the proposed approach, the distribution system feeders are clustered based on the parameters, which cannot be controlled by distribution companies. Afterward, a reliability incentive regulation is applied to each cluster so that the performance of each feeder is compared to its counterparts in the same cluster. The quality regulation is designed based on the reward‐penalty mechanism, which penalizes feeders whose performance is worse than a benchmark and rewards those providing a performance higher than the benchmark. Then, the reward and penalty associated to the electric distribution company are determined to summarize the rewards and penalties for all feeders. Having this approach implemented, utilities compete to make more profits by serving customers at higher reliability levels. To assess the effectiveness of proposed method, it is applied to a real distribution network containing 194 feeders.

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“…Since these frameworks were outlined and kept up to exclusive expectations, this disintegration was not apparent immediately. The reliability quality appeared to be satisfactory for quite a long time, yet it then began to break down quickly (Jooshaki 2014;Brown and Burke 2000). At the point of unwavering reliability, issues pertaining to quality became apparent as organizations do not regularly have the required assets to resolve the issue (Wangdee 2005), .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cubic reward penalty structure for power distribution companies

Sumesh

Potdar

Krishna

2019

Int J Syst Assur Eng Manag

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An important significance of restructuring in power industry is the emergence of regulatory performance indices in the power distribution companies. Reward-penalty scheme is a direct control method that regulators use to assure the performance regulatory controls such as system reliability, service efficiency, and customer interruption cost. It is used as a financial tool designed to prevent the service reliability and efficiency deterioration of power distribution companies. Reward penalty scheme rewards the distribution company which provides good reliable power and penalizes those who act otherwise. In this paper, we propose a Cubic Reward-Penalty scheme, to improve the service reliability of power distribution companies. The novel feature of this scheme is the use of cubic reward/ penalty formulation which varies in a cubic fashion based on the behavior of the performance-based reliability. In this paper, two methods of implementing Cubic Reward-Penalty scheme are explained: CRPS with no dead band and no reward/penalty capping and CRPS with dead band and reward/penalty capping. These proposed approaches are mainly intended for the regulators who are concerned about the customers affected by the outage duration. The significance of this research, lies in encouraging power distribution companies, to maintain, or even improve, customer service and satisfaction, by developing the Performance Regulatory Reward-Penalty schemes. This paper also provides most of the requirements and design rationale of Cubic Reward-Penalty Structure, its theoretical foundation and its prototype implementation.

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A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

Cited by 11 publications

References 14 publications

Designing a new procedure for reward and penalty scheme in performance-based regulation of electricity distribution companies

Designing a new procedure for reward and penalty scheme in performance-based regulation of electricity distribution companies

Reliability incentive regulation based on reward‐penalty mechanism using distribution feeders clustering

Cubic reward penalty structure for power distribution companies

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