A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally

Budge, Ian

doi:10.1017/s0007123400006955

Cited by 393 publications

(340 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

305

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…They further suggest that the spatial modeling framework helps us understand electoral competition not only in advanced but also in newer democracies (see also Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009). More specifically, our results have important implications for party strategies in relatively new democracies (Budge 1994;Laver 2005; see also Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010). In these democraciescharacterized by unstable party systems (Birch 2003;Powell and Tucker 2013;Rose and Mishler 2010;van Biezen 2003;Tavits 2005), uncertainty about how election outcomes are translated into governing coalitions (Druckman and Roberts 2007;Grzymala-Busse 2001;Tzelgov 2011), and uncertainty about how governing coalitions formulate policy-citizens reward parties that present extreme party positions, because these parties are more successful at communicating clear policy stances than moderate parties.…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe

Ezrow¹,

Homola²,

Tavits³

2014

The Journal of Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We argue that extreme positioning benefits parties in new democracies, because-given the lack of other reliable cues such as party histories-the distinctiveness of their left-right policy positions increases voter certainty about parties' identities and intentions in office. Cross-sectional analyses provide evidence that, in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe, parties that are farther away from the mean voter position gain more popular support than those moderately positioned along a policy continuum. In established democracies, by contrast, policy moderation increases popular support. We also find empirical support for the proposed causal mechanism that links policy positions to popular support via voter certainty. These findings have implications for party strategies, spatial theories, and our understanding of political representation in new democracies.E xisting cross-national research suggests that parties gain votes by adopting positions close to the mean (or median) voter's position (Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000a;Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000b;Dow 2001Dow , 2011Schofield 2004; see also Schofield, Sened, and Nixon 1998a;Schofield et al. 1998b). 1 In this article, we argue that this relationship is less likely to hold in new democracies, where parties are, instead, more likely to be rewarded for extremism than centrism. Our argument, which we detail in the next section, builds on three central premises derived from the existing literature. First, parties with less ambiguous positions (i.e., positions about which voters, on average, are more certain) attract more electoral support. Second, centrist positions generate more ambiguity and voter uncertainty than noncentrist positions. Third, noncentrist or extremist positions are particularly effective in reducing voter uncertainty when other cues about party identities and intentions are absent, as is the case in new democracies.In order to test our argument, we conduct a macrolevel analysis of party positioning and election outcomes across 31 countries from 1996 to 2007. 2 Our study produces the following findings. First, with respect to the established democracies, we corroborate the findings of the existing studies of multiparty competition that parties receive a statistically significant electoral benefit from locating near the mean voter position. Second, in line with our theoretical expectation, we find that in the context of new, postcommunist democracies, parties receive an

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 79%

When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe

Ezrow¹,

Homola²,

Tavits³

2014

The Journal of Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Following Budge's (1994) work on party competition, several scholars have argued that election results constitute an important signal of these preferences and should, thus, affect strategic decisions made by candidates and parties (Adams et al, 2004;Somer-Topcu, 2009). When making these decisions, parties only have information about their past policy shifts and how these shifts were rewarded or punished at the polls.…”

Section: Elections and Party Positionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, the degree and direction of these shifts depends on the type of party as well as their internal organization (Adams et al, 2006;Schumacher, Vries, and Vis, 2013). Elections should play a crucial role in this process since they signal the preferences of the electorate to parties, and, thus, influence parties' future policy positions (Budge, 1994). Yet, several scholars who have empirically investigated if parties adapt their position according to previous election results have presented evidence supporting and refuting this hypothesis (Adams, 2012;Ezrow, Vries, et al, 2011;Somer-Topcu, 2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Moderate as Necessary: The Role of Electoral Competitiveness and Party Size in Explaining Parties’ Policy Shifts

Abou-Chadi

Orlowski

2016

The Journal of Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article investigates how the degree of electoral competition affects parties' policy positions. It follows a growing body of research on party positioning in multiparty competition that regards elections as signals for parties that have to choose their positions and issue strategies. In this article we argue that previous elections provide information about the competitiveness of the upcoming election. The expected degree of electoral competition affects parties' future policy positions since with increasing competitiveness of an election, parties have higher incentives to move toward a vote-maximizing position. However, what constitutes a vote-maximizing strategy varies between parties. While large mainstream parties have an incentive to moderate their positions, small and niche parties choose more extreme positions to distinguish themselves from their mainstream competitors. Applying a novel measure of electoral competitiveness, we find that the degree of electoral competition indeed determines parties' policy shifts, but that this effect is moderated by party size. AbstractThis paper investigates how the degree of electoral competition affects parties'

show abstract

“…Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009, 828) suggest that, in spatial models where parties have full information, the vote share of a party depends largely on the positions that its most proximate competitors take. Similarly, Budge (1994) and Laver (2005) suggest that parties develop their issue-based strategies mainly by looking at their close rivals, which Budge (1994, 454) terms 'marker parties'.…”

Section: Electoral Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Issue Engagement in Election Campaigns The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Organizational Constraints

Meyer¹,

Wagner²

2015

PSRM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is easier for voters to make informed electoral choices when parties talk about the same issues. Yet parties may decide against such 'issue engagement'. We hypothesize that issue engagement between parties is more likely (a) when the similarity of their policy positions means that both parties have clear electoral incentives to talk about the same topics and (b) when parties face few organizational constraints in terms of campaign resources. Our empirical analysis of 2,453 press releases by Austrian parties shows that ideological proximity and party resources affect the level of issue engagement. These findings suggest that issue engagement is less likely precisely where it is needed most, which has important implications for understanding the democratic quality of election campaigns. Pre-print version of the accepted manuscript:Meyer, Thomas M., and Markus Wagner (2015). 'Issue engagement in election campaigns: the impact of electoral incentives and organizational constraints ', Political Science Research and Methods. FirstView.

show abstract

A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally

Cited by 393 publications

References 13 publications

When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe

When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe

Moderate as Necessary: The Role of Electoral Competitiveness and Party Size in Explaining Parties’ Policy Shifts

Issue Engagement in Election Campaigns The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Organizational Constraints

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About