A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Paroush, Jacob

doi:10.1007/s003550050014

Cited by 63 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1 2 . We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m ≥ 3 is preferable to a random single expert. …”

mentioning

confidence: 85%

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Berend

Sapir

2005

Soc Choice Welfare

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Abstract. Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1 2 . We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m ≥ 3 is preferable to a random single expert.

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confidence: 85%

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Berend

Sapir

2005

Soc Choice Welfare

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“…That is shown by counterexamples in Owen et al (1989). Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000) prove that if all individuals have a competence greater than 0.5, then the group competence is greater than the average individual competence, thereby offering a weaker version of the non-asymptotic result. a complex network of influences, the independence condition is unlikely to be met perfectly.…”

Section: The 'Independence' Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic aspects of representative government

Goodin

Spiekermann

2011

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy, and trustee-style representative democracy.

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“…The first part establishes the superiority of SMR over individual decision-making (the 'expert rule'), provided that voter skills are sufficiently competent and homogeneous, Condorcet (1785), Paroush (1982, 1985). (This result was subsequently extended to the case where there is uncertainty regarding individual decisional skills (Ben Yashar and Paroush (2000), Berend and Sapir (2005), Nitzan and Paroush (1985).) The second part establishes that SMR converges to a probability of 1 of making the correct decision as the number of voters grows, provided that the voters are sufficiently competent, individually or on average (Condorcet (1785), , Owen, Grofman and Feld (1986), Berend and Paroush (1998), Paroush (1998)).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

et al. 2011

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: D700.

show abstract

A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem

Cited by 63 publications

References 24 publications

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Epistemic aspects of representative government

Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

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