A noncooperative model of contest network formation

Huremović, Kenan

doi:10.1111/jpet.12475

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 75 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The authors investigate optimal seeding rules (according to various criteria), which sort the players into two groups for elimination in the first stage, and find that seedings that delay encounter of strong players are optimal for various criteria. 7 Finally, our paper is also related to the literature of (static) contests with team players or alliances, such as Nitzan (1991), Skaperdas (1998), Esteban and Ray (2001), Münster (2007), 6 There is also an extensive literature on Tullock contests with asymmetric valuations or endogenous network structure (see, e.g., Feng & Lu, 2017;Huremovic, 2021;Nti, 1999;and references therein). Asymmetry in our setting however is different and is due to collusion, which leads to different payoff functions and strategy sets among the players.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Elimination contests with collusive team players

Chen

Jin²

2022

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider a standard two-stage elimination (Tullock) contest where multiple (team) players can perfectly and publicly collude with each other throughout. We analyze and compare equilibrium outcomes under various seedings where the collusive players meet or are separated in the group stage. We identify the impact of collusion on the contest organizer and non-collusive players, as well as the organizer's optimal seeding. We find that collusion, while always undermining fairness of the competition, can hurt or benefit the organizer, depending on the discriminatory powers of the two stages. We also discuss issues such as sequential group-stage competitions, comparison between the elimination contest and the corresponding one-shot contest, secret collusion, and large discriminatory powers.

show abstract

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Elimination contests with collusive team players

Chen

Jin²

2022

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…only group 1 exist in the contest: if β ∈ (1, 2], according to Proposition 4, group 2 retires from the contest and the effort of group 1 is still decreasing in s. Therefore, we get the largest aggregate effort X(0) = v1v2(v1+ωv2) (v1+v2) 2 at s * = 0. If β > 2, after the weak group retires from the contest, the effort of group 1 is still increasing in s, by (26), and we can maximize aggregate effort X( v1…”

Section: Endogenous Group Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…, after the weak group retires from the contest, by (26), we can get the highest aggregate effort X( v1 4 ) = v1 4 at s = v1 4 . It is easy to verify that X(s * 1 ) > X( v1 4 ) for any…”

Section: Endogenous Group Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, from the perspective of maximizing the aggregate effort, we assume the draw endogenous and investigate the optimal strategy to yield higher aggregate effort. By modeling the bilateral interaction as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw, Huremovic [26] studies a model of weighted network formation, and shows that an increase in the likelihood of a draw had a non-monotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. All these papers show that introducing draws into individual contests can affect the individual player's incentive to exert effort and the organizer's profit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw

Chang

Wang

2023

JIMO

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper investigates Tullock group contests with the possibility of a draw in which the winner, if any, shares the prize with other players in his group, and each group's sharing rule is private. Considering the draw is exogenously determined, we investigate the strategic choice of the sharing rules and individual effort. We find that introducing the draw into the contest has negative effects on individual payoff, while players would increase the sharing rule. When groups are symmetric, the possibility of a draw decreases all group's individual effort. In the model with asymmetric groups, the draw has a non-monotonic effect on the aggregate effort and individual effort of the strong group with larger value for the prize. Next, considering the draw is endogenously given, we investigate the strategy for maximizing aggregate effort. In the asymmetric model, when groups' values of the prize are dispersed enough or the organizer cares much more about the strong group, introducing a draw into the contest would increase the aggregate effort. However, no draw is most beneficial to the aggregate effort if the organizer puts more weight on the weak group. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze and illustrate the results.</p>

show abstract

“…The network characterizes players' social relations in society, so the network structure affects the level of effort of participants in different contests. 4 Franke and Özt ürk (2015) and Huremović (2021) consider conflict networks where multiple participants are involved in multiple bilateral conflicts. Xu, Zenou, and Zhou (2022) use variational inequality techniques to address equilibrium uniqueness and propagation of shocks in conflict networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effort Discrimination and Curvature of Contest Technology in Conflict Networks

Sun¹,

Xu²,

Zhou³

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network among multiple contestants, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under both two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality result holds within the class of semi-symmetric conflict network structures: both the aggregate actions and equilibrium payoffs under two regimes are the same. We also show that, in some sense, the Tullock form is necessary for such a neutrality result. Moving beyond the Tullock family, we further demonstrate how the curvature of contest technology shapes the welfare and effort effects. Connection to the literature on price discrimination is also discussed.

show abstract

A noncooperative model of contest network formation

Cited by 8 publications

References 75 publications

Elimination contests with collusive team players

Elimination contests with collusive team players

An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw

Effort Discrimination and Curvature of Contest Technology in Conflict Networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About