A Note on Ad Valorem and Per Unit Taxation in an Oligopoly Model

Grazzini, Lisa

doi:10.1007/s00712-006-0201-y

Cited by 22 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Moreover, these theoretical approaches provide a theoretical foundation for different pass-through rates of specific and ad valorem taxes, with the former ones being passed through to a larger extent. Finally, from a welfare perspective, ad valorem taxes Paretodominate specific excise taxes under imperfect competition, see Grazzini (2006), Denicolò and Matteuzzi (2000), Anderson, De Palma and Kreider (2001a) and Anderson, De Palma and Kreider (2001b), among others, for theoretical discussions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax pass-through in the European beer market

Ardalan

Kessing

2019

Empir Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the pass-through of indirect taxes on beer prices in the European Union (EU). Exploiting the variation of value added tax rates, beer excise tax rates, and beer prices in a panel of monthly data from 1996 to 2016 of all current 28 EU member states, we estimate the tax pass-through of specific beer excise taxes and ad valorem value added taxes, respectively. Ad valorem taxes are under-shifted at a rate of approximately 70%. Specific excise taxes are almost fully shifted to prices in the EU, but, in contrast to the empirical findings for the US, there is no evidence of over-shifting. Nevertheless, the difference between ad valorem and specific tax pass-through rates indicates that imperfect competition plays an important role in the European beer market.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax pass-through in the European beer market

Ardalan

Kessing

2019

Empir Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the other hand, other papers show that specific taxes may be more welfare enhancing (see, for example, Hamilton 1999;for monopsony;Grazzini 2006;or Blackorby and Murty 2007;for general equilibrium;Anderson, De Palma, and Kreider 2001a;Anderson, De Palma, and Kreider 2001b;Hamilton 2009;Wang and Zhao 2009; for differentiated or multiproduct oligopolies; Pirttilä 2002; in the presence of externalities; Kind, Koethenbuerger, and Schjelderup 2009; in two-sided markets; or Goerke 2011; Kotsogiannis and Serfes 2014;under uncertainty conditions).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do maritime passengers’ subsidies in Europe affect prices?

Jiménez

Valido

Morán³

2018

Maritime Policy & Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Some European governments subsidize their residents when they travel at sea. This paper seeks to analyze the impact on prices of maritime passengers' subsidies in Europe. Following a review of the scarce academic literature on this topic and the subsidy scheme in Europe, a sample of firms' prices and other characteristics of 40 European routes for 2016 are analyzed. Both an estimation of a price equation and a matching approach are applied and reach the same conclusion: prices per kilometer are around 40 per cent higher on those subsidized routes due to subsidies. This outcome reduces the potential subsidy gain to consumers.

show abstract

“…Recently, in a model with endogenous market structure Vetter (2017) shows that a specific tax may be superior to an ad valorem tax. In a strategic market game model of oligopoly, Grazzini (2006) shows that specific taxation can be superior to ad valorem taxation, but this result is driven by the social welfare function. Schröder (2004) shows that ad valorem taxation is superior to specific taxation under monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, but Vetter (2013) argues that the result is due to the functional form rather than the mode of competition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes

Azacis

Collie

2017

J. Econ.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation that results in the same collusive price has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same collusive price. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (J Public Econ 97:196-205, 2013) it is shown that the revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax.

show abstract

A Note on Ad Valorem and Per Unit Taxation in an Oligopoly Model

Abstract: imperfect competition, strategic market game, commodity taxation, H22, L13, C72, D51,

Cited by 22 publications

References 13 publications

Tax pass-through in the European beer market

Tax pass-through in the European beer market

Do maritime passengers’ subsidies in Europe affect prices?

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About